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Venture capital companies are investment entities that focus solely on making investments in startups and 
early-stage growth companies, attempting to generate above-market returns by taking higher risks in their 
investments. Making investments in high-risk startup and early-stage growth companies means that venture 
capital companies have to implement sophisticated and robust processes to identify, analyze, manage and 
monitor wide variety of different risks associated with small and fast-growing companies that are often 
developing cutting edge technology and creating new innovative business models. In addition, venture 
capital companies also have to manage company level risks that are related to business operations and 
factors, such as reputation, capital raising process, financial contracting and exiting investments. 
The purpose of this study is to understand how venture capital companies structure risk management 
strategy and processes on company level. Furthermore, the study attempts to identify what are the most 
important risks that venture capital companies face in their business and what methods and techniques 
venture capital companies use to mitigate those risks. The study was conducted using a qualitative research 
method and the research data was collected through semi-structured interviews in order to gain deeper 
understanding of the subject matter and the motivations of the interviewees. In total, four interviews were 
conducted. The interviewees were partners and employees in venture capital companies and other 
investment companies that had at least one active venture capital fund under their management. All of the 
participants were selected so that the sample would be as representative as possible. The questions 
presented were based on common risks and risk management methods found both in studies concerning 
venture capital investing and literature about venture capital risk management. They were designed to be 
semi-structured and open-ended so that it would be possible to gain in-depth information about the topics 
of the interview and to have the option to further explore any of the topics. 
The findings of the study indicate that venture capital companies are able to manage their risks without 
creating a formal company level risk management strategy or complex company level risk management 
structures. Instead, the data shows that venture capital companies use standardized risk management 
frameworks for evaluating the risks and return potential of individual investments and that the venture capital 
industry has a fairly standardized set of notable risks and risk management methods that are used to control 
and mitigate those risks. The results also indicate that reputational risks, risks concerning insufficient or 
inadequate screening and due diligence processes and the risks of a premature exit transaction have the 
highest importance of direct operational risks, whereas on the risk management side, the most important 
methods for controlling and mitigating risks are portfolio diversification, thorough screening and due 
diligence processes, active monitoring of portfolio companies and careful financial contracting. The analysis 
of the data also reveals that most of the interviewed venture capital investors do not recognize company 
level risk management as a major differentiator or competitive advantage when raising capital for a new 
fund or sourcing new investment opportunities. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
When one examines and compares different time periods and geographical areas from the 
perspective of welfare, it becomes obvious that economic growth is one the most important factors 
in creating welfare in a society. The bulk of this economic growth is created by businesses, which 
combine natural resources, labor and capital to create goods and services. However, some 
businesses create more economic growth than others. In the past, large corporations were 
responsible for most of the economic growth in developed countries, but in the 1970s and 1980s 
economic activity started to move away from large corporations to small companies. This trend has 
continued to grow over the years, and as a result small businesses have become an integral part of 
the economy in developed countries. (Wennekers & Thurik 1999) For example, in the United States 
99.9 percent of all companies are small companies, and these small businesses accounted for 65.9 
percent of net new job creation from 2000 to 2017 (https://www.sba.gov 2018).  
 
An important subcategory of small businesses are startups. These companies differ from other small 
businesses primarily in willingness to grow the business at an accelerated pace. Startups, also called 
early-stage or emerging growth companies, try to design their businesses in a way that enables 
them to scale and grow the business very quickly. The pursuit for growth comes at a cost, as most 
startup businesses need considerably more funding to ramp up their operations and to achieve 
positive cash flow. The very short, or completely empty, operating history and negative cash flow 
result in startup companies not being eligible for business loans in most cases, which means that 
these companies have to sell equity to investors in order to finance their operations. Selling shares 
to an investor dilutes startup founders’ ownership of the company, but at the same time gives a 
clear incentive for the investor to help the company to grow. The right investor can provide highly 
valuable contacts, partnerships, advice and professional services that accelerate the growth of the 
business. (Salamzaden & Kesim 2015) 
 
The most notable challenge for startups and their investors is the fact that approximately fifty 
percent of startups fail in the first four of years of operation and seventy percent have failed after 
ten years from inception (www.bls.gov 2016). These failure rates demonstrate how operating and 
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investing in a startup company requires a considerable amount risk-taking. This high risk-level of 
startups and other small growth companies stems from financial and historical data that shows that 
these companies usually make very little or no sales at inception and are characterized by having 
business strategies and models based on hypotheses or based simply on a prototype. In addition, 
startups face a multitude of risks related to technical, financial, competitive, regulatory and 
managerial factors. Depending on the investors risk aversion, the considerable amount of risk 
inherent to startup companies can also be observed as a possibility, since risk and reward are most 
of the time highly related on the financial markets. (Salamzaden & Kesim 2015) 
 
Due to the very high risk-return tradeoff of startup investing, a new group of private equity 
investment entities, called venture capital companies, started to emerge in the 1950s to offer a less 
risky way for large institutional investors and wealthy individuals to invest in early-stage 
companies by employing an investment strategy that focuses on making minority equity 
investments into a large amount of high-risk growth companies. This financing system for early-
stage companies has given institutional investors and wealthy individuals, who are often called 
limited partners or fund sponsors in the venture capital industry, access to an asset class that has 
been historically producing higher returns on invested capital than the public stock markets. The 
average annual return for venture capital funds has been 27.99 percent during the last 30 years, 
whereas S&P 500, the most popular indicator for average annual stock market returns, has 
generated 9.69 percent return on average. (www.cambridgeassociates.com 2017; www.hbr.org 
1998) 
 
However, these significantly higher returns include increased amount of volatility compared to the 
S&P 500 and other stock indices. It is also uncertain if the venture capital industry is able to sustain 
such high returns in the future, as financial markets and the economy keep evolving into new 
directions. As an example of this uncertainty, the average annual return for venture capital 
investments in the last ten years has been 9.04 percent. During the same period S&P 500 has been 
able to produce almost the same level of returns with 8.50 percent average increase in value. 
(www.cambridgeassociates.com 2017) In addition to high returns, venture capital funds also 
provide diversification benefits to their limited partners as a result of venture capital’s 
concentration on small growth companies which possess only little correlation with publicly traded 
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companies. The most important reason for this non-correlation is that venture capital investments 
in generally have little or no value until the portfolio company is either sold or taken public in an 
initial public offering. Before the final exit is completed, most venture capital companies do not 
record profit or loss from an investment unless it is viewed as worthless. (www.hbr.org 1998) 
 
Just as the companies that receive venture capital are varied, the venture capital companies 
themselves are a highly heterogeneous group of investors. They differ in several various factors, 
such as investments strategies, motivations, approaches, size and location. Venture capital 
company’s investment strategy outlines the general investment thesis, which often includes 
information on how large individual investments and at what part of the business cycle investments 
the company is looking to make. Expected return on investment, exit strategy and possible 
specialization on specific industry are also regularly defined in venture capital investment 
strategies. In addition, different motivations and approaches of the venture capital company’s 
managers and limited partners can influence the investments thesis. Some venture capital investors 
actively offer help and guidance to their portfolio companies, whereas others act mostly as passive 
investors. (Ramsinghani 2014) During the last few years, venture capitalists have also become more 
aware of social issues such as diversity and equality, which therefore have slowly started to gain a 
foothold in the venture capital industry. For instance, the amount of women and minority-owned 
venture capital companies has steadily grown, and at the same time venture capital investors are 
increasingly looking to fund early-stage growth companies that are owned by minority 
entrepreneurs. (www.fairviewcapital.com 2017) 
 
In most instances, the size of a venture capital company is measured by the amount of capital it has 
raised from its limited partners. Some venture capital companies raise a few million dollars, 
whereas others raise hundreds of millions, or even billions of dollars’ worth of capital. Factors such 
as previous success, investment strategy and vision, physical location of the venture capital 
company and the condition of local and international financial markets affect how much capital 
they are able to raise from limited partners. (Cumming et al., 2005) This capital is divided into 
separate venture capital funds, which usually have a fixed ten-year maturity period. The capital 
invested in a fund is invested in the first 2-3 years from the inception, after which the venture capital 
company focuses on managing and making possible follow-up investments to the portfolio 
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companies. The actual transaction of capital from limited partners to the venture capital fund is 
done subsequently over time as the fund starts investing in companies. (Kuckertz et al. 2015) 
 
In addition to the aforementioned differences between venture capital companies, physical location 
of the company as well is a major differentiator in venture capital industry and has a significant 
impact on the raising and investing processes of a venture capital fund. In the modern globalized 
world, venture capital companies could diversify their investments geographically, but several 
studies (Kang et al. 2017; Zook 2005; Florida & Smith 1992) have shown that venture capital 
investing is characterized by behavior which prefers investing in businesses that are geographically 
close to where the venture capital companies themselves are located.  Most venture capital 
companies are clustered in a few major cities and financial centers in high tech regions, such as 
San Francisco, Boston, London, Toronto, Beijing and Shanghai. These areas draw venture capital 
as a result of high concentration of young growth-stage companies and access to pools of highly 
educated and experienced professionals. Venture capital companies require these resources in order 
to source lucrative investment opportunities, build social networks, support portfolio companies 
and organize investments. (Mason 2007) 
 
Investing solely in high-risk startup companies, means that venture capital companies have to have 
sophisticated and robust processes to identify, analyze, control and monitor wide variety of 
different kind of risks related to small and fast-growing companies that are often working with 
cutting edge technology and creating new innovative business models. Venture capital risk 
management is usually divided into pre-investment and post-investment stages, which both have 
different set of risks and risk management techniques. During the initial pre-investment stage 
venture capital financiers focus on identifying and evaluating risks such as agency and market risks, 
financial risks, macro-level risks, product development risks and risks related to management’s 
performance. To mitigate these risks, venture capital companies are using multiple different risk 
management methods, which include conducting pre-screening and due diligence, making 
contractual provisions and clauses that protect the investor, joining together with other investors to 
create a syndicate that shares the investment and dividing the investment into several stages that 
are connected to milestone events. (Kut et al. 2007; O. Fiet 1995) 
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The post-investment stage of venture capital investing is comprised of continuous monitoring of 
risks and other crucial key indicators and supporting portfolio companies to grow their businesses. 
Furthermore, venture capital investors also use monitoring to attempt to correct potentially harmful 
behavior by founders and management teams. According to study conducted by Kut, Pramborg & 
Smolarsk (2007), venture capital companies perceive management related risks, such as lack of 
performance and focus, to be to most important risks for existing portfolio companies. To reduce 
the overall risk of their investment portfolios in the post-investment stage, venture capital 
companies often diversify their investments across different industries, geographic locations and 
investment stages. Comparing correlation between companies in portfolio and comparing 
correlation between portfolio and the stock market is also another risk management method that 
assists venture capital companies to assess portfolio concentration risks. (Manigart & De Clercq 
2007; Kut et al. 2007) 
 
Despite of the pre-screening, due diligence and risk management processes, venture capital 
investing always involves a significant amount of risk, which can only be minimized but can never 
be completely removed. This fact is backed by statistics that show how only four percent of venture 
capital investors’ portfolio companies produce most of the returns, while sixty-five percent of 
portfolio companies produce negative returns and twenty-five percent modest returns 
(www.invesco.com 2016). This means that in order to give their limited partners higher returns on 
their capital compared to the public financing markets, venture capital companies need to find and 
invest in extremely successful early-stage companies that can increase the value of invested capital 
by several multiples. For example, a venture capital fund that lasts approximately 10 years has to 
at least triple in value before the fund’s maturity date to beat the annual average return from the 
stock market (www.cambridgeassociates.com 2017).  
 
As a result of this “hit-or-miss” structure of venture capital funding, venture capital companies 
have to be very selective in choosing which companies they fund, and thus they screen hundreds 
or even as many as a thousand deals per year to have a realistic probability to discover even a 
handful of high-potential early-stage companies. In order to increase the likelihood of discovering 
the most potential early-stage companies, venture capital companies analyze and monitor a matrix 
of varying industry sector characteristics, some of which include, how long it takes on average for 
6 
 
pre-revenue companies to start producing revenues in different sectors, the expected revenue-to-
expense ratio in relation to required amount of capital and time, and at what stage of a company’s 
development cycle should an investment be made to gain the greatest possible return on investment. 
(O. Fiet 1995; www.tuck.dartmouth.edu 2003) 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
Some actions and inactions have a chance to create a situation where value can be either gained or 
lost. This event is called risk, and even though it can have positive or negative realization, it is 
usually associated with situations where value is lost. Risks are present in almost every aspect of 
any activity, and they can be either planned or unplanned. According to Tchankova (2002), risks 
can be classified into seven different distinct sources, which are physical, social, political, 
operational, economic, legal and cognitive environment. Regardless of the risk source, risk is 
always attached to some level of uncertainty, which means that it has a possibility to be realized, 
but there can be no absolute certainty of the realization. Due to the loss of value from realized risks 
and uncertainty created by known risks, it is crucial to implement measures to control risks and 
mitigate their effects. This control and mitigation of risks is called risk management; it is a process 
that identifies, evaluates, analyzes, prioritizes and monitors risks and allocates resources to reduce 
their probability and impact. (Kaplan & Garrick B. John 1981) 
 
The first stage of the risk management process, called risk identification, is an integral part of any 
kind of risk management. Non-identified risks are not known, which means that they cannot be 
properly assessed and controlled. These unknown risks can have very unexpected consequences 
because of the reason that it is not possible to prepare for these kinds of risks. As a result of this 
significant threat that non-identified risks pose, it is crucial for organizations and individuals to 
attempt to identify all possible risks. In organizational context, risk identification requires 
inspection of all organizational activities and processes in all functions of the organization and at 
every managerial level. External and internal changes in the environment create new risks 
continuously, which means that risk identification has to be a constant process that proactively 
identifies new risks. Correct and thoroughly done risk identification reveals and determines the 
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possible risks and creates a solid foundation for the rest of the risk management process and ensures 
its efficiency. (Tchankova 2002; https://www.mitre.org 2018a) 
 
The second stage of risk management process is evaluation of identified risks. It can be defined as 
a process by which organizations and individuals determine how acceptable any given risks are. In 
its simplest form, risk evaluation can be seen as a process that categorizes all identified risks either 
as acceptable or unacceptable. Risk analysis, another part of the risk management process, is used 
in conjunction with risk evaluation to gather information regarding risks that are under the 
evaluation process. The objective of risk analysis is to provide adequately detailed information to 
facilitate risk evaluation process to properly evaluate identified risks. The two main factors 
analyzed and evaluated at this point of the risk management process are the probability of 
occurrence and expected consequences of a risk. If a risk is seen as acceptable, it does not require 
further action other than regular monitoring. But when a risk is qualified as an unacceptable, it 
requires an adequate action that reduces the risk to a level that is deemed acceptable. Depending 
on the preferences of the organization or individual and the intrinsic qualities of the risk, it can be 
lowered by either reducing its probability, mitigating its consequences or completely removing it. 
(Klinke & Renn 2002; https://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org 2012) 
 
After identified risks have been divided to acceptable and unacceptable, the latter group is separated 
into different categories based on the urgency of the need to control and mitigate specific risks. 
This phase of the risk management process is called risk prioritization analysis. An organization or 
individual has limited amount of resources to deploy for risk management actions, which means 
that in most cases it is not possible to designate all identified unacceptable risks with equal measure 
of risk management actions at the same time. The main purpose of prioritization process is to guide 
this deployment of risk management actions and form a basis for optimal resource allocation. There 
are multiple quantitative and qualitative methods and techniques that can be utilized to facilitate 
the prioritizing process. Quantitative methods include techniques such as probability distributions, 
sensitivity and simulation analyses, expected monetary value analysis and weighting of 
consequence, probability and timeframe in cardinal risk evaluations. Qualitative techniques for 
prioritization include analysis of probability and impact, categorizing of unacceptable risks, 
ranking risks with multiple impacts according to frequency, forming impact and probability 
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matrixes and creating assessments that measure the urgency of unacceptable risks. Different risk 
prioritizing techniques have different advantages and disadvantages depending on the situation, 
therefore prioritization has to be a continuous process that factors in relevant external and internal 
variables in order to develop optimal combination of risk prioritizing techniques for varying 
circumstances. (https://www.mitre.org 2018b) 
 
When risks have been identified, evaluated, analyzed and prioritized, risk management process 
advances to the risk mitigation stage. The ultimate purpose of risk mitigation process is to reduce 
the probability that a risk will occur, diminish the impact of a risk that has realized and, in some 
cases, remove the risk completely. However, before the implementation of actual risk management 
actions takes place, a risk mitigation strategy is commonly created for an effective and coordinated 
execution of said risk management actions. Risk mitigation strategy typically contains information 
about determined root causes of previously analyzed risks, alternative options for mitigation 
methods and tools for the most critical risks, assessments and prioritizations of mitigation 
alternatives, estimates of required resources for specific risk mitigation actions and plans for 
communication of risk mitigation to all stakeholders of the risk management process. In accordance 
with the previous stages of risk management process, risk mitigation planning is an ongoing effort 
that requires regular adjustments as external and internal variables, that affect organizations or 
individuals, shift. (National Research Council 2005) 
 
An adequate strategy for implementing risk mitigation actions provides a basis for the operational 
stage of risk mitigation process. The four most common types of risk mitigation actions used in 
this operational stage of risk mitigation process are risk avoidance, transfer, control and acceptance. 
The first class of risk mitigation actions contains techniques that attempt to avoid risks completely. 
The concept behind risk avoidance is that, in many risk situations and environments, the most 
effective method to protect against unaccepted risks is to try to avoid them completely. In most 
instances, risk avoidance means a refusal to engage in a certain activity or activities that are 
perceived or known to bear risks that the organization or individual is not willing to take. Albeit 
risk avoidance is simple and powerful risk mitigation method, it does carry a significant drawback 
in lost opportunities, lost positive risks and the loss of events and situations that could have had 
favorable aspects to an organization or individual. For the aforementioned reasons, using risk 
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avoidance as a risk management action to mitigate risks typically requires a careful analysis of the 
advantages and disadvantages created by avoiding any given action. (National Research Council 
2005) 
 
If risk avoidance is not possible or beneficial, another option to attempt to completely remove a 
risk is to transfer the risk to another party. In this risk mitigation method, an organization or 
individual shifts an individual risk or a group of risks to a party that is willing to carry those risks. 
Usually this kind of exchange requires that the risk-taking party is adequately rewarded for the 
transfer. The most common form of risk transfer is by means of an insurance policy. Risk transfer 
through insuring typically happens via voluntary arrangement, where one party agrees to pay 
another in exchange for protection against financial losses caused by those risks that the insuring 
party has agreed to insure. By using insurance, it is possible for organizations and individuals to 
transfer specified risks of loss to other parties that are more capable to manage those possible 
financial losses. Another way to utilize risk transfer as a risk mitigation method is through non-
insurance agreements such as contracts, warrants and futures. An important distinction between 
insurance agreements and non-insurance agreements is that an insurance policy does not transfer 
the risk itself, but only the financial losses caused by it, whereas non-insurance agreements 
typically transfer the whole risk and its possible impact. These non-insurance agreements can have 
a multitude of provisions, clauses, conditions and terms that transfer risks from one or more parties 
to other another party or parties. (Mullai 2006; National Research Council 2005) 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned non-insurance agreements, outsourcing is another notable, and 
often contract-based, method to transfer unwanted risks. When an in-house service or function is 
outsourced to an outside party, risks attached to those services and functions are also transferred to 
the outsourcing provider. However, in most instances it is not possible to completely remove risks 
by using outsourcing; for example, risks related to the interruption of supply are often retained in 
some extent by the outsourcing party. Using risk transfer as a risk mitigation method can be entirely 
appropriate when all involved parties are fully aware of the risks and rewards of the exchange. The 
risk-assuming party chooses to carry another party’s risks because it has skills, knowledge or other 
attributes that it can utilize to reduce the transferred risks. When these conditions are met, it is 
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economically efficient and rational to transfer the risks, as each of the parties participating believe 
that they are better off after the exchange than before. (Söderlind 2007; Mullai 2006) 
 
Risks that cannot be removed completely by using risk avoidance or transference have to be 
retained.  An organization or individual can either try to control these unavoidable risks through 
different mitigation techniques or simply accept them. The former option is typically called risk 
control; it is a risk mitigation method that attempts to reduce, mitigate or manage the probability 
and impact of retained risks. The total risk exposure of a risk can be calculated, as a rough 
approximation, through multiplying its probability by the potential impact or damage incurred by 
the occurred risk event. Most often the main objective of risk control process is to reduce the total 
combined risk exposure of all identified risks by implementing risk control actions that reduce 
either probability or impact, or, in some cases, both at the same time. Extensive risk analysis and 
risk mitigation strategy facilitate and guide the most effective allocation of risk control resources 
for a maximal reduction of the total combined risk exposure. In addition, risk control process has 
to constantly compare the costs of risk control actions with the projected return on investment of 
those risk control actions to be able to make decisions that ensure the most efficient use of capital. 
(Söderlind 2007; Mullai 2006) 
 
The other option for controlling risks that cannot be avoided or transferred, or these methods are 
not financially feasible, is to accept them. This method is called risk retention, and it is typically 
recognized as the last resort of risk mitigation methods. In a situation where all the other risk 
mitigation methods are either inadequate or incur costs that are too high, risk retention is the only 
option for an organization or individual to move forward with the desired action or inaction. 
Acceptation of specific risks requires thorough analysis and evaluation of the retained risks in order 
to chart all the possible consequences that they could cause. Failure to accurately assess accepted 
risks may result in underestimating the potential losses, which in turn creates dangerous 
vulnerabilities where the organization or individual is not aware of these potential losses, and thus 
is not able to prepare for their occurrence adequately in advance. When accepted risks and their 
consequences are fully understood, it is possible to make an informed decision about the use of risk 
retention by comparing the potential gains and losses of taking the action or inaction related to 
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accepted risks with a situation where the risks are not accepted and the action or inaction is not 
taken. (Söderlind 2007; National Research Council 2005) 
 
Risk monitoring is the final stage of risk management process; its purpose is to ensure that changes 
in existing risks are observed and evaluated correctly and that new risks are identified promptly. In 
addition to tracking new and existing risks, risk monitoring also measures the effectiveness of the 
risk management strategies, processes and risk mitigation actions which are implemented by an 
organization or individual. The process of monitoring risks and effects of risk mitigation actions is 
a crucial part of risk management process due to the fact that organizations, individuals and their 
environments are never static, and because of this, the risks related to these factors do not stay 
constant either. Risks that have been already identified can be monitored in order to recognize and 
identify potential emerging trends in their probabilities and consequences. The constant change 
does not just alter existing risks, but also creates completely new risks factors that can have 
significant consequences. To identify these risks, it is necessary to observe changes both in macro 
level factors, such as economy and international politics, and in micro level factors that directly 
affect an organization or individual. When changes are identified in the aforementioned factors, 
risk evaluation and risk analysis processes are updated correspondingly. The findings of risk 
monitoring processes can be utilized as a guidance to readjust existing strategies which may have 
proved to be inaccurate or ineffective and create new strategies for improved risk management 
processes. Furthermore, risk monitoring can help to reveal whether adequate guidelines and 
policies were followed, whether implemented risk mitigation actions are as effective as expected 
or whether risk assumptions made previously are still valid. (Hallikas et al. 2004; 
https://www.loc.gov/ 2015) 
 
1.2 Research questions and limitations 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand how risk management is planned and conducted in 
venture capital companies. In addition, this study pursues to learn what kind of risk management 
strategies venture capital companies use and how important role risk management has in different 
stages of venture capital companies’ business processes. The main research question of this study 
is as follows: 
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1. How do venture capital companies structure risk management strategy and processes on 
company level? 
 
The sub-questions of this study are as follows: 
 
1. What are the most important risks that venture capital companies face in their business? 
2. What methods and techniques venture capital companies use to mitigate risks? 
 
The unit of analysis of this study has been limited to venture capital companies and funds, which 
are a sub-asset class of private equity investments. Private equity is an asset class comprised of 
capital that is invested in entities that are not listed on any public stock exchanges. It focuses on 
long-term value creation through active ownership that involves constant focus on identifying and 
introducing measures that create and add value, acceleration of long-term growth and implementing 
operational improvements with lasting effects. Private equity includes investment strategies such 
as leveraged buyout, growth capital, venture capital, mezzanine financing and distressed debt. The 
research limitation to venture capital has been made due to the reason that venture capital industry 
has significantly larger amount of individual companies, separate funds and available data 
compared to other private equity investment vehicles.  
 
The second limitation of this study is the process of risk management, which is one of the business 
functions that enterprises and other business organizations establish and operate to carry out their 
mission and strategy. Business functions can be grouped into core functions and support functions. 
Core functions relate most directly to the basic business of the enterprise, whereas support functions 
facilitate the operation core business functions. (Brown P. 2008) Risk management process can be 
its own business function or integrated into other business functions, depending on factors such as 
industry, organization and business model. The decision to limit business functions to only risk 
management process was made because of the inherently high-risk business model of venture 
capital and the lack of prior research studies on company-level risk management in venture capital 
companies. 
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The third limitation of the study regards the perspective of examination. A venture capital company 
can be examined on three different levels; company level, fund level and portfolio company level. 
A company level perspective examines investment funds and individual investments as a whole, 
whereas a fund level perspective only considers individual investment funds and portfolio company 
level respectively individual investments. (Ramsinghani 2014) Due to the fact that the purpose of 
this study is to understand how venture capital companies are structuring risk management 
processes on company level, this study does not focus on examining the risks and risk management 
processes that solely concern individual venture capital funds or portfolio companies. A Venture 
capital company’s investment portfolio, which typically consists of all the ownership stakes it 
currently holds in various companies, is primarily examined on company level as a single entity 
that is subject to risks and risk management processes. 
 
1.3 Definition of key concepts 
 
Private equity – Private equity is a part of the alternative assets class, which also includes hedge 
funds, real estate, derivatives and natural resources. It is capital that has been invested in privately 
owned companies in exchange for an ownership stake. Investments in private equity are highly 
illiquid, and thus are held for considerably long periods of time. (Ramsinghani 2014) 
 
Venture capital – Capital invested or available for investments in ownership stakes of startup 
companies and other early-stage companies that are seeking to grow rapidly. Also called risk 
capital. (https://www.nasdaq.com 2018a; https://www.merriam-webster.com 2018a) 
 
Venture capital company – A private company that provides capital to startup companies and 
other early stage companies in order to accelerate their growth or bring new products or 
technologies to market. Venture capital companies pursue to generate returns that exceed the 
average stock market returns by taking higher risks in their investments. (Ramsinghani 2014) 
 
Venture capital fund – An investment vehicle that pools funds from third-party investors, 
generally from institutional investors and high net-worth individuals, to invest in startup companies 
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and other early-stage companies that are identified to have strong growth potential. Venture capital 
funds are raised, invested and managed by venture capital companies. (Ramsinghani 2014) 
 
Portfolio – A collection of investments held by an organization or individual. A portfolio can 
contain financial assets such as stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies and cash equivalents or 
alternative assets like real estate, art, private investments and other investments that are not publicly 
traded. (https://www.nasdaq.com 2018b; Ramsinghani 2014) 
 
Startup – A newly established business that seeks to solve a marketplace need or problem through 
a business model that is repeatable and scalable. (https://www.nasdaq.com 2018c; Ramsinghani 
2014) 
 
Growth company – A company that is growing faster than other companies in the same field. 
Growth companies typically invest aggressively in future growth by directing a high proportion of 
generated income back into the business. In most situations the growth is driven by an innovative 
product or service that has more attractive value proposition than competing solutions. 
(https://www.merriam-webster.com 2018b; https://www.nasdaq.com 2018d) 
 
General partner – A participant who has unlimited liability for the obligations of a partnership. 
In venture capital, general partners serve as the managers of the venture capital company. General 
partners make the investment decisions on behalf of the venture capital funds that they are 
managing. (https://www.nasdaq.com 2018e; Ramsinghani 2014) 
 
Limited partner - A partner who has limited legal liability for the obligations of the partnership. 
In venture capital, investors of venture capital funds are called limited partners. Most limited 
partners are either institutional investors such as pension funds, endowments and other financial 
institutions, or high net-worth individuals and family offices. (https://www.nasdaq.com 2018f; 
Ramsinghani 2014)  
 
IPO – Initial public offering. A company’s first sale of shares to the public stock markets. When a 
private company completes an initial public offering it becomes a public company that is traded on 
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a stock exchange. The shares that are offered to the public in an initial public offering can be either 
issued by the company or sold by the existing investors. In the latter situation company is raising 
new capital and diluting existing shareholders, whereas in the former situation only the ownership 
structure of the company is changed. (https://www.nasdaq.com 2018g) 
 
Investment strategy – A plan that describes investor’s risk averseness, principles of capital 
allocation among different investment vehicles and future needs for capital. Investment strategy is 
combined of rules, procedures and predetermined actions, which are designed to create a 
framework to guide and facilitate the selection of suitable investments. (https://www.nasdaq.com 
2018h) 
 
Due diligence – A comprehensive examination and inspection of a business, conducted by a 
prospective investor or acquirer. Due diligence is a multi-step process that evaluates assets, 
liabilities and commercial potential of a business in order to enable a potential buyer or investor to 
make an informed decision. (Ramsinghani 2014) 
 
Risk management – The process of identifying, analyzing, evaluating, prioritizing, controlling 
and monitoring risks. Risk management is a process and a mindset that has to involve the whole 
organization and all its processes to create an effective and robust system for managing risks. 
(https://www.thefreedictionary.com 2018; https://www.chapman.edu 2006) 
 
Risk mitigation – A systematic process to reduce risk exposure by lowering the probability of a 
risk occurring and/or reducing the amount of negative consequences of a risk. Often used risk 
mitigation methods include risk avoidance, risk transfer, risk control and risk retention. 
(https://www.chapman.edu 2006) 
 
Risk management action – An action that is intended to avoid, transfer or control a specific risk 
or group of risks. Actions such as divestment of a business unit, shutting down a product or service, 
outsourcing operations, contract making, insuring, increasing workplace safety and guarding 
against cyber-attacks are typical examples of risk management actions. (https://www.chapman.edu 
2006) 
16 
 
 
1.4. Research methodologies and material 
 
In order to carry out the study in an adequate manner and satisfy the previously defined objectives, 
a qualitative research methodology was chosen as the appropriate means to conduct this study. A 
qualitative research methodology provides an opportunity for a comprehensive in-depth study of 
risk management processes used in venture capital companies and allows the research to investigate 
the motivations behind these risk management processes. In addition, the relative scarcity of 
venture capital companies and the complex composition of different risk management processes 
further supported the choice of qualitative research method. 
 
The qualitative research method of semi-structured interviews was selected for collecting the 
research material for the study. This approach aims at obtaining rich descriptive information about 
the knowledge and personal experiences of the interviewees for the purpose of understanding the 
significance of risk management processes on company level in venture capital companies. In 
addition, semi-structured interviews encourage two-way communication and allow the 
interviewees to express their views freely in their own terms, and thus, open the opportunity for the 
interviews to provide not just answers, but the reasons for the answers.  
 
The aim of the interview process is to interview approximately three to six partners or employees 
from different Finnish venture capital companies. The interviews consist of a list of predetermined 
questions and topics that guide the interview, but the open-ended nature of the questions 
simultaneously provides the opportunity for identifying new perspectives of understanding the 
topics at hand. The interviews will be conducted either in-person or over the phone. 
    
1.5. Previous studies 
 
Although there is an abundance of research and studies done on venture capital and risk 
management separately, there is only a relatively moderate amount of existing research and studies 
of recent origin that examine how venture capital companies integrate different risk management 
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processes into their business processes on company level. Some of the previously conducted 
research has focused on how venture investors conduct their business and how significant role risk 
management has in their daily activities. Moreover, different sub-sections of risk management in 
the private equity sector have been the focus of a few other studies. As an example, these sub-
section studies have examined the different aspects of syndication, contracting, agency costs and 
the use of convertible securities. One notable observation of venture capital risk management 
research is the fact that, even though international research on the subject matter of venture capital 
risk management is starting to emerge with increasing frequency, the research is still quite US-
centric. The data used in these studies comes mostly from United States and China.  
 
One of the most well-known studies done on venture capital risk management is done by James O. 
Fiet (1995), where he examined how market risk and agency risk affect decision making in venture 
capital companies. The study presented statistically significant evidence that venture capital 
companies viewed market risks as considerably more important than agency risks due to 
standardized contractual provisions that provide venture capital companies effective protection 
from most agency risks. Another finding of the study was that venture capital companies tend to 
selectively acquire information about different types of risk, because specializing in the collection 
of a specific type of risk-reducing information reduces their costs through the development of 
economies of scale. In accordance with these findings, the study additionally found out that venture 
capital firms specialize more in market risk than agency risk. 
 
Other influential study on venture capital risk management was conducted by Can Kut, Bengt 
Pramborg and Jan Smolarski (2007). In their study they analyzed how a range of different risk 
management methods, including portfolio risk mapping, pre-screening and post-investment 
monitoring, are used by venture capital companies to control and mitigate different risks that are 
inherent in venture capital investing. The main findings of the study were that (a) investment pre-
screening and risk monitoring in existing portfolio companies is highly important to venture capital 
companies; (b) traditional investment portfolio hedging is less important to venture capital 
companies; and (c) project-specific risks vary according to the type of the investment vehicle used; 
for example, venture capital funds and buyout funds are exposed to distinct ranges of risks due to 
their differing investment strategies. Based on the results of the study, Kut, Pramborg and 
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Smolarski suggested that venture capital companies should use generally available standardized 
tools during the post-investment and portfolio monitoring stages to a greater extent, which could 
potentially create significant improvements in their return distributions. The researchers also 
proposed that limited partners should demand the use of standardized post-investment risk 
management techniques from venture capital companies in order to ensure that they operate as 
efficiently as possible.  
 
1.6 Theoretical framework 
 
1 The flow of capital in venture capital industry 
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The figure above depicts how capital moves through the venture capital ecosystem. The underlying 
chain of events starts from the pool of capital owned by institutional investors and high-net-worth 
individuals. These investors, called limited partners, allocate a part of their capital pool, typically 
couple percent of the total investable capital, to venture capital funds that are managed by venture 
capital companies. When the capital has been allocated to venture capital companies, they start 
distributing it to businesses by making equity investments in the most promising startup companies 
that are looking for capital to accelerate their growth. Startup companies in turn invest the capital 
in activities such as research and development, sales, marketing and hiring more employees, hoping 
to create a business that can provide a meaningful return to the investors and founders of the 
company.  
 
The invested capital starts to flow back to venture capital companies and limited partners usually 
when a startup is either acquired by another company or it goes public with an initial public 
offering. Only a small amount of startup companies reach these investment exit events, and even if 
they do, only a minority of those exits are meaningfully profitable. In some cases, it is also possible 
for the investor to the sell the ownership stake in a startup company to another investor on a 
secondary shares market. After the liquidation of the investment, the capital moves back to the 
venture capital company, which takes a cut of the capital if the investment was able to generate a 
large enough return. Rest of the capital moves back to the pool of capital owned by limited partners, 
and the process of allocating capital repeats. 
 
 
2 VENTURE CAPITAL RISK MANAGEMENT  
 
 
To be successful in the business of venture capital, is most often understood to require a 
combination of strong educational and professional background, industry expertise, excellent 
human skills, extensive professional networks and a strategic “CEO perspective” mindset. In 
addition to these essential personal attributes, successful venture capital companies need to create 
a well-organized investing entity that has solid corporate governance and effective and efficient 
core and support business functions. (Smart et al. 2000) Risk management is one of these crucial 
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business functions, but due to the inherently risky nature of venture capital, the need for a robust 
risk management function that is embedded in all operations is particularly necessary for venture 
capital companies. Proper risk management processes and tools lessen the negative effects of 
asymmetric information, reduce the amount and severity of unsuccessful investments and ensure 
that investment portfolio concentration risks are thoroughly identified and evaluated. Moreover, 
effective and systematically organized risk management is an important factor for limited partners 
in their investment making decision process; conversely, inadequate risk management processes 
can drive away limited partners from investing in a venture capital fund. (Proksch et al. 2016) 
 
The following section of the study utilizes existing literature and studies on risk management in 
venture capital companies to provide a comprehensive analysis of the risks in venture capital 
investing and risk management techniques venture capital investors are using to mitigate those 
risks. The section begins with examining the most significant and frequent risks venture capital 
companies encounter in their business; the examination is conducted through the perspective of 
several primary business functions that comprise the core of venture capital investing. After 
identifying and explaining the risks inherent in the business of venture capital, the section proceeds 
to observe and analyze multiple different risk management techniques used by venture capital 
companies to mitigate and avoid risks previously presented in the risk portion of the section.  
 
2.1 Risks in venture capital financing 
 
The risk environment of a venture capital company is a complex, multifaceted and differs in many 
ways from companies that produce and sell services or products. Not only are venture capital 
companies subject to all the business related risks that their portfolio companies face, but in 
addition they have a slew of other risks related to factors such as investment processes, relationships 
with LPs and investment liquidation events. For the purposes of this study, these different venture 
capital business processes are divided into four distinct operating processes that hold their own set 
of risks; (a) raising funds, (b) investing funds, (c) managing portfolio and (d) exiting investments. 
(Ramsinghani 2014; Ørjan 2011) This process flow structure describes the comprehensive 
operation and lifecycle of a venture capital fund and the risks associated with the different 
operational phases during the lifecycle of a venture capital fund in a chronological order. Other 
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risks that are not clearly connected to any of the above-mentioned operating processes, such as 
risks related to general administrative tasks and interpersonal conflicts, are examined in their own 
chapter. (Proksch et al. 2016) 
 
2.1.1 Risks associated with raising capital 
 
Although a venture capital company is most often the more dominant party who is being pitched 
in funding negotiations, this situation is reversed when the venture capital company is starting a 
new fund. The process of raising funds has many parallels to the capital-raising process for startup 
companies; general partners of the venture capital company develop an investment strategy, 
compelling story and a pitch deck, which are then presented to targeted institutional investors for 
the purpose of raising capital. The fund-raising process can last as long as 18 months, depending 
on factors such as previous experience of the general partners and the investment team, market 
opportunity of the investment strategy, track record of successful investments and current portfolio 
companies in previously raised venture funds. The longer the funding takes, the higher the risk for 
the effort to fail; any potential investors want to know how long the capital raise has continued and 
how much of the total size of the fund has been committed or raised in order to evaluate the 
momentum and likelihood of successful closing of the fund. Slow progress in raising funds is a 
warning sign for many potential investors, and thus a major failure risk in raising a venture capital 
fund. (https://ilpa.org 2018; Ramsinghani 2014) 
 
Raising investment capital can be particularly challenging for venture capital companies that are 
raising their first venture fund and do not have general partners with past success in either founding 
companies or making venture capital investments. According to a study conducted by PitchBook 
(2018), debut fund venture capital companies that had operational and venture capital investment 
experience in their management, were 14 percent more likely to raise a second venture capital fund 
compared to those first-time venture capital companies that did not have any operational or venture 
capital investing experience. Most large institutional investors perceive first-time funds and new 
managers as a too risky investment and prefer experienced investors and venture capital companies 
with a strong track record of previous successes. As a result, the managers of first-time funds 
usually focus their capital raising efforts on high net worth friends, colleagues, family members 
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and other wealthy individuals or organizations in their respective networks. Venture capital 
companies with several successful funds and experienced general partners, in turn, are generally 
able to raise funds from large institutional investors, such as pension funds, endowments, fund of 
funds and foundations. The venture capital funds of the largest and most famous venture capital 
companies are such in-demand that these companies can choose their limited partners and raise 
capital for a new fund in a matter of weeks. The high demand from institutional investors also gives 
these venture capital companies significant leverage to ask for larger share of the profits and other 
advantageous contractual provisions that reduce the risks in capital-raising process. (https://ilpa.org 
2018; Kuckertz et al. 2015; Ramsinghani 2014) 
 
Most venture capital funds have a fund-raising process that includes two different fund closings: 
the first close and final close. The process of first close typically occurs when approximately 40-
70 percent of the total size of the fund has been committed by investors. When the first close has 
been completed, general partners of a venture capital fund can start making investments at the same 
time as they are raising the remaining amount of capital to reach the target size of the fund. In the 
event that the remaining capital is successfully raised, the venture capital fund will conduct the 
final close, which concludes the fund-raising process and no new investors are admitted to the fund. 
In order the achieve the first or final close and receive the committed capital, the venture capital 
company is required to finalize and circulate private placement memorandum, general partnership 
agreement, limited partnership agreement, subscription agreement and respective side letters to all 
closing investors. The involvement of multiple parties and complex orchestration of multiple legal 
agreements makes the closing process vulnerable to delays and other unexpected issues. 
Consequently, procrastinating investors pose a notable risk to the closing process and in many cases 
cause waste of time and resources. In terms of risk management, the first close is a crucial milestone 
that greatly reduces the risk of failure. Even if the fund does not reach the target amount and conduct 
the final close, in most cases it will continue operating and investing with the capital it has raised 
in the first close. (Ramsinghani 2014; Rosenberg 2002) 
 
The risk of unsuccessful capital raise is also affected by factors such as the targeted size, sector, 
investment stage and geography of the fund. The size of the fund is ultimately determined by its 
investment strategy, construction of portfolio, target sectors and capital needs to maintain fund 
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ownership. As the size of the fund grows, so do the risks related to the capital-raise process. In 
general, the amount of previous successful funds and the level of experience of the general partners 
are the two most important factors that determine how large a fund a venture capital company is 
able to raise. Another essential capital raise risk factor is the sector of investment, which defines 
the industries, markets and types of businesses that the fund targets. Different sectors, industries 
and markets display unique key characteristics, such as volatility, growth prospects, capital 
requirements and profitability, which may either increase or decrease the risk of unsuccessful fund-
raise, depending on how potential limited partners perceive the attractiveness of these key 
characteristics. For example, technology sector offers exposure to strong growth and volatility, 
whereas utilities sectors offers stability and relatively high dividend yields at the cost of low growth 
rates. Correspondingly, different markets and industries inside a specific sector either attract or 
repel potential limited partners, and hence affect the capital raise process and its failure risk. 
(https://www.fidelity.com 2018; Ramsinghani 2014; Rosenberg 2002) 
 
In addition to size and sector, potential limited partners take into account the targeted investment 
stage and geography in their investment decision-making process. The different stages of 
investment, seed, early and growth, require different amounts of capital and provide varying risk-
return profiles. Typically late-stage and growth-stage funds raise more capital than funds that focus 
on seed-stage and early-stage investments, but that does not necessarily mean that late-stage and 
growth-stage funds are exposed to higher fund-raising failure risk compared to seed-stage and 
early-stage funds. Funds that target late-stage and growth-stage investments are most often started 
by venture capital companies with strong track records and experienced general partners, which, 
as previously stated, significantly reduce the risk of unsuccessful capital raise. However, if past 
performance is excluded in the observation, the less complex and fewer individual investors 
requiring capital-raising process of seed-stage and early-stage venture capital funds can be 
perceived to generate less risk exposure. (Kuckertz et al. 2015; Elango B. et al 1995) 
 
Geographic location plays an important role in both sides of venture capital funding; fund raising 
conducted by venture capital companies as well as startup companies is always influenced on some 
level by the location of the entity raising funds. In their study, Chen et al (2010) found that venture 
capital companies located in San Francisco, New York and Boston outperform and generate higher 
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return on investment and internal rate of return compared to venture capital companies in other 
U.S. cities. In another study observing the same geographical effect, Lindström (2006) discovered 
that the aggregate performance of venture capital companies has been lower in Europe than in the 
U.S. As a result of this geographic disparity between venture capital investment returns, potential 
limited partners are more interested in providing capital to venture capital funds that are managed 
by venture capital companies located in metropolitan areas with thriving startup ecosystems. 
Consequently, the attempt to raise capital for a venture capital fund in a remote location that lacks 
the tangible infrastructure, intangible infrastructure and network of organizations, which interact 
as a system that facilitates startup companies to scale their business fast and efficiently, has a higher 
risk of failure compared to the aforementioned metropolitan areas with strong startup ecosystems. 
(Chen et al 2010; Mason 2007) 
 
In addition to internal factors and determinants of a venture capital fund, external macroeconomic 
factors influence the process of raising capital and the risks associated with it. The general condition 
of financial markets is a crucial component in raising capital from potential limited partners; in 
favorable market conditions available capital is more abundant and sentiment towards riskier 
investments among potential limited partners is more positive. Comparably, weak market 
conditions hinder the capital-raising process for venture capital funds and increases the risk of an 
unsuccessful fund raise. The importance of market timing and utilization of the so-called “window 
of opportunity” is also strongly correlated with the size of the capital raise, which means that large 
capital raises from large institutional investors are more sensitive to present market conditions than 
smaller raises from high net-worth individuals and small or medium-sized organizations. 
(Ramsinghani 2014) 
 
Another less recognized risk associated with venture capital fund raising is reputational risk. 
Reputation is particularly important in the venture capital industry due to a large number of 
competitors and weak market concentration. Strong reputation attracts more investment 
opportunities and capital from limited partners. In this context reputational risk refers to the risk 
that a limited partner in a venture capital fund suffers or has previously suffered reputational risk 
that impacts the venture capital company that is managing the fund. These indirect reputational 
risks are often very difficult to predict and can occur suddenly without any warning, causing 
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significant damage to the venture capital company and all its stakeholders. Capital-raising 
reputational risk can also occur if limited partners’ backgrounds are not properly investigated, 
exposing the venture capital company to indirect reputational risks stemming from the historical 
conduct of said investors. In the event that indirect reputational risk is materialized, the capability 
of a venture capital company to raise additional capital and make investments can be severely 
hampered. Additionally, the occurred reputational risk can also spread to venture capital company’s 
portfolio companies and cause damage to their sales and brand value, which, in turn, causes even 
more damage to the venture capital company through declining portfolio company valuations. 
(https://hbr.org 2018; Khrishnan et al 2007)             
 
2.1.2 Risks associated with making investments 
 
When a venture capital company has conducted the first close of a new fund, it shifts to an 
investment period and commences the investment process. The investment period typically lasts 
from three years to five years, during which the venture capital fund actively seeks to make 
investments according to its investment strategy and generate target returns. Successful completion 
of a venture capital investment requires the deal to progress through a process that has multiple 
stages. The actual investment process can be divided into three different phases: (a) sourcing and 
screening investment opportunities, (b) conducting due diligence and (c) negotiating investment 
terms and closing the investment. The investment process starts with sourcing and screening 
potential investments; this means that a venture capital company uses multiple different sources to 
find large amounts of early-stage growth companies and identifies individual attractive companies 
from these large groups of companies. The most common high quality sources of investment 
opportunities typically exist within social networks that venture capital company’s general partners 
have created over time. These networks consist of entrepreneurs, peer investors, attorneys, industry 
experts and other individuals who regularly work or communicate with new fledgling businesses. 
Other investment sources include different startup accelerators and incubators, angel investor 
networks, banks and other financial institutions, corporate spinouts and university technology 
transfer offices and research labs. In addition, events such as trade conferences, business plan 
competitions and startup pitch sessions are regularly used as a sourcing channels among venture 
capital investors. (Ramsinghani 2014; Klonowski 2007; Kaplan et al 2000) 
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Most venture capital companies are presented with hundreds or even thousands of investment 
opportunities a year, depending on the efficacy and robustness of their respective sourcing 
pipelines. The high volume of investment opportunities requires that venture capital companies 
have a fast and efficient screening process that selects the most viable ventures with lucrative risk-
reward ratios. In order to achieve the returns expected by the limited partners, screening process 
has to be able to systematically separate high potential investment opportunities from subpar 
investment opportunities. The screening criteria used in the screening process generally varies 
between different venture capital investors, and in addition personal experience and views can have 
a significant effect on the outcome of the screening evaluation. However, factors such as market 
size, technology, business strategy, competition, management team and scalability of the business 
are used by most venture capital investors in their respective screening processes. For maximum 
efficiency, screening process is typically divided into multiple levels which gradually weed out the 
ventures that do not meet the required risk-reward ratio. For example, the initial screening level 
usually takes a few minutes and consist of reading an executive summary or some other short 
business presentation, whereas the final screening often happens in a meeting where the 
entrepreneur presents the business to the venture capital investor. (Marvin 2006; Kaplan et al 2000) 
 
The second phase of venture capital investment process, called due diligence, begins when an 
investment opportunity successfully passes the screening process. Due diligence is a 
comprehensive fact gathering and reviewing process that aims to provide the investor with all the 
material information regarding an investment and a full understanding of all business operations, 
assets, liabilities and risks inherent in the investment opportunity. The overall goal of the process 
is to evaluate the potential return on investment and economic viability of the investment 
opportunity in order to make an informed investment decision. As with the screening process, a 
due diligence process is typically conducted in multiple stages that gradually become more granular 
as the process nears the final investment decision. The exact structure of the process differs between 
investors and their preferences, but some of the common aspects of due diligence include verifying 
management team’s track records and backgrounds, performing market, product, customer and 
competitor analyses, conducting legal and IT due diligence and reviewing audited financial 
statements. (De Cleyn et al 2007; Kaplan et al 2000) 
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In the event that due diligence process is successfully completed and the decision to invest is made, 
the investment process moves to the third phase: negotiating the investment terms and closing the 
investment. The objective of the negotiations is to structure the investment transaction in a way 
that both parties find acceptable. The negotiated terms define the structure of the investment, which 
contains the framework that describes how the investment capital flows from the investor to the 
company and back. The design of the investment structure includes a large amount of different 
provisions and clauses that are governed by two key parameters: economics and control. From a 
venture capital company’s perspective, economics of the investment structure define its options to 
invest more if a portfolio company performs favorably, whereas control structures provide the 
venture capital company with rights that minimize the risks in a downside scenario where the 
portfolio company has not performed as expected. If both parties of the investment transaction find 
the investment terms agreeable, legal documents are drafted, signed and the capital is wire 
transferred to the portfolio company.  (Feld et al 2017; Ramsinghani 2014) 
 
The majority of risks inherent in the investment period and investment process can be divided into 
two distinct categories: specific risk and agency risk. The risks in both of these categories are 
mostly driven by incomplete information and the future uncertainty of innumerable external 
factors. Specific risks are risks that affect a venture capital company indirectly through its portfolio 
companies. There are two sets of factors that cause the portfolio company specific risks: business 
risk factors and financial risk factors. Business risks include internal and external factors that have 
a possibility to adversely affect a portfolio company’s business operations and cause losses to 
investors through lower valuation of the business. Internal factors relate to the management and 
operational efficiency of the business, whereas external factors include, for instance, market 
demand, technological development, existing and potential competition and other unforeseen 
occurrences caused by company’s stakeholders. The other set of company specific risk factors 
consists of financial risks. These risks are connected to the capital structure of a company and its 
ability to meet its financial obligations. Weak capital structure increases a portfolio company’s risk 
of inconsistent earnings and cash flows, illiquidity and bankruptcy, hence implicitly increasing the 
venture capital company’s total specific risk. (Proksch et al. 2016; O. Fiet 1995) 
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Agency risk can be described as the degree of uncertainty that a portfolio company’s founders will 
withhold relevant information from investors and pursue their own interests instead of complying 
with the terms of the investment agreement. It emerges when the interaction between founders and 
investors includes high amounts of investment uncertainty, behavioral incentive problems, 
information asymmetry and difficulty to monitor the actions and motivations of the founders. As a 
result, investors cannot be certain that founders are acting in investors’ best interests instead of 
behaving opportunistically and diminishing the monetary value of investors’ stake in the company. 
Agency risk consists of two different time-related aspects: adverse selection and moral hazard. The 
former arises from incomplete information provided by the founders to the investors before an 
investment has been made, whereas the latter is caused by founders not acting according to the 
investment agreement after an investment transaction has been completed. Adverse selection and 
moral hazard can result in unsuitable and excessively risky investments and founders’ exploitative 
behavior, which have the potential to cause major investment losses for all investors, including 
venture capital companies. (Bellavitis et al 2017; O. Fiet 1995) 
 
The amount and potential impact of portfolio company specific risks and agency risks emerging 
during the investment period are strongly correlated to a venture capital company’s screening 
process, due diligence and terms of the investment. Moreover, sourcing process can also be 
perceived as a risk factor; insufficient flow of investment opportunities can be particularly a 
challenge for young venture capital companies without robust sourcing networks. Inadequate 
screening and due diligence processes lead to investments that hold unidentified and insufficiently 
evaluated risks, which can significantly affect the valuation of the investment on both short-term 
and long-term, and thus cause an increase in the risks of the investment process and period. 
Additionally, inaccurate screening process can result in unnecessary waste of time and resources if 
unsuitable investment opportunities are not screened out early enough in the process. When 
properly designed, the terms of the investment protect a venture capital company from specific 
risks and agency risks during the investment period, whilst poorly structured investment terms do 
not remove or reduce the impact of occurred specific risks or agency risks, therefore increasing the 
risks inherent in the process of making investments. Wrong or inadequate provisions and clauses 
can prevent a venture capital company from exiting or reducing its position in underperforming 
portfolio companies, or lead to a situation where a venture capital investor is not able prohibit an 
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entrepreneur from taking an action that is unfavorable to the investor. (Proksch et al. 2016; O. Fiet 
1995) 
 
Another important factor of the investment process is the stage of the investment. The risks 
associated with a venture capital company’s investing process are usually strongly related to the 
level of development of the venture. Early-stage companies, which are firms that have not yet 
developed a viable product or service, are more uncertain and carry higher risks compared to 
second-stage or late-stage companies, which are firms that already have operational business 
models and generate revenue. As a company progresses through these different stages, agency risks 
and specific risks surrounding the company start to diminish in most instances. However, even 
though investments in early-stage companies typically carry more risk than investments in later 
stage companies, the required amount of capital invested in these ventures is often considerably 
lower compared to later stage ventures. Smaller investment amounts mean less exposure to the 
risks of individual investments and enable more comprehensive portfolio diversification, thus 
leading to a lower amount of total risk exposure associated with investments in early-stage 
companies. Correspondingly, late-stage companies bear less agency and specific risks, but require 
larger investments, hence increasing the potential impact of a realized investment risk. 
(Ramsinghani 2014; Elango B. et al 1995) 
 
2.1.3 Risks associated with managing investment portfolio 
 
When a venture capital fund’s investment period is over and its portfolio is fully constructed, the 
fund can no longer make investments in new companies, but it can invest its reserved capital in 
existing portfolio companies. This third operation phase of a venture capital fund, called the 
investment term, commences after the capital raised from limited partners has been invested and 
allocated. It generally lasts from five to seven years, depending on the willingness of the limited 
partners to keep the fund operating. The amount of available investment capital during the 
investment term depends on how much investment capital has been allocated to future funding 
rounds for each company in venture capital fund’s portfolio at the time when the initial investments 
are made. During this portfolio management period a venture capital company makes follow-on 
investments from the funds that the venture capital fund has reserved, closely monitors the fund’s 
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performance and generated returns and actively supports its portfolio companies to grow their 
respective businesses. (Feld et al 2017) 
 
Monitoring and supporting portfolio companies are the two most important activities for a venture 
capital company during a fund’s investment term. The broadness of these activities means that they 
overlap with each other, and in many cases represent complementary roles. The focus on 
monitoring relates to a venture capital company’s need to prevent and correct any potentially 
harmful activities that portfolio companies’ entrepreneurs might do, regardless if they are 
intentional or unintentional. Considering the information opaqueness encompassing early-stage 
ventures and the strong emphasis on intangible assets in most venture capital investments, close 
monitoring conducted by the venture capital company is important in order to understand the 
behavior and actions of the entrepreneur. Supporting, on the other hand, focuses on value adding 
activities that attempt to increase the upside potential of portfolio companies. Venture capital 
companies’ general partners often have technological, financial, industry, and managerial 
experience, leadership skills and networks which might be central for the success of the venture 
and reduce the risk of failure. (Proksch et al. 2016; De Clercq & Manigart 2007) Several studies 
have proven that venture capital companies are able to add meaningful value to portfolio companies 
by providing them with different types of value added services like strategy, governance, financials, 
operational improvements and human capital improvements (Tang et al. 2014; Guo & Jiang 2013; 
Cumming et al. 2005; Bottazzi et al. 2002). 
 
Venture capital companies normally monitor and add value to their portfolio companies through 
informal and formal channels. Communication through informal channels includes interim 
financial reports, periodical checkups on the progress of the business in physical meetings or over 
the phone and quarterly portfolio reviews. Formal monitoring and value-adding are performed by 
a venture capital company’s general partner or manager taking a seat on the board of directors of 
their portfolio company. The board of directors is a formal governance mechanism that oversees 
all activities and has the ultimate decision-making authority, therefore making it the most important 
tool for venture capital companies for monitoring, controlling and supporting their portfolio 
companies. Choosing the right person to serve on the board is important for venture capital 
companies due to board members being bound by strict fiduciary duties, which require directors to 
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act in the best interests of the corporation and with the care that an ordinary prudent person in a 
similar position would exercise under comparable circumstances. (Ramsinghani 2014; De Clercq 
& Manigart 2007) 
 
The primary role of a board member, including venture capital board members, is to create and 
sustain value, select and assess chief executive officer and manage risks through building a business 
strategy which is supported by effective management, financial planning, market analysis and legal 
compliance. While serving on the board of a portfolio company, venture capital board member’s 
legal duty is to the common stockholders in the long term, not to the holders of preferred stock. 
However, board members appointed by venture capital companies also have a fiduciary duty to the 
venture capital fund and its limited partners, which can, in certain situations, cause a conflict of 
interest and create litigation risk, if the board member places the venture capital fund’s interests 
ahead of the portfolio company’s common stockholders’ interests. In the case of a breach of duty, 
in addition to the personal liability of a venture capital company-nominated director, the venture 
capital company is at risk of being drawn into a litigation if the prosecution has evidence that shows 
that the venture capital has somehow aided or facilitated the breach of duty. (Davis & Guye 2018; 
Ramsinghani 2014; De Clercq & Manigart 2007) 
 
As with the investment process, portfolio management phase is likewise subject to risks related to 
information asymmetry between the venture capital investor and the entrepreneur. These risks stem 
from factors such as differing goals between the two parties, changes in entrepreneur’s behavior 
after receiving an investment and unequal distribution of essential information. The risk of 
incongruous goals relates to situations where the entrepreneur, for example, focuses on generating 
personal income or attempts to keep the company operational even if it is not beneficial for the 
investors. Equally, the venture capital investor might be aiming for an early exit by selling the 
company to a corporate buyer or private equity investor, whereas the entrepreneur may have 
ambitions to continue building the company and stay independent. If the aforementioned 
contradictory goals are not controlled and aligned properly, they are likely to have negative effects 
on the company’s operations and decision-making process, ultimately affecting the valuation of the 
portfolio company and its upside potential. (De Clercq & Manigart 2007) 
 
32 
 
Behavioral alterations that occur following an executed financing deal are another sub-category of 
asymmetric information risks that venture capital funds often encounter during the portfolio 
management phase. These post-investment agency issues are typically defined with the term ‘moral 
hazard’, which pertains to a party’s potential neglecting behavior and unwillingness to make efforts 
that are sufficient enough considering circumstances, even in a situation where it has the capability 
to meet pre-set expectations (Eisenhardt, 1989). Moral hazard is a result of a situation where the 
entrepreneur, as an insider of the company in addition to being the controlling officer, has access 
to information about the company that is not available to the venture capital investor. Once having 
received the investment, the entrepreneur may use this information asymmetry to change her 
behavior in order to misinform and mislead the investor. For example, the entrepreneur might try 
to hide the actual progress and status of the business, or act in a way that prioritizes her own wealth 
over the company’s well-being. This kind of behavior can be highly detrimental to a venture capital 
fund’s portfolio company, therefore making it necessary for venture capital companies to supervise 
and monitor portfolio entrepreneurs’ activities. (De Clercq & Manigart 2007; Cable & Shane 1997) 
 
Another group of portfolio management related risks arises from the combined performance of a 
venture capital fund’s investments. Each individual fund has its own financial objectives, typically 
related to generating a high-enough return on investment for the limited partners. A venture capital 
fund’s total investment return to limited partners is calculated by combining the returns received 
from selling the fund’s ownership stakes in its portfolio companies. The total return generated is 
always uncertain to some extent, which means that every venture capital fund has a chance that the 
combined returns from portfolio companies are not high enough to meet the financial objectives of 
the fund. This uncertainty in portfolio performance can be defined as portfolio risk. The amount of 
portfolio risk is directly connected to the financial assets in the portfolio, and thus it is possible to 
adjust the amount of risk in any given investment portfolio through asset allocation and investment 
time frame. By using proper asset allocation and investment time frame management, investors are 
able to set the portfolio risk to match their respective risk tolerances. (Proksch et al. 2016; 
http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu 2003) 
 
In the context of venture capital investing, designing and constructing an investment portfolio 
factors in the size and timing of investments with the perspective to balancing cash flows and 
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optimizing the chosen risk-reward ratio. The primary factors that affect a venture capital fund’s 
portfolio risk include investment timing, investment stage, investment sector, geography of the 
investments, number of investments and investment amount at the point of entry. For venture 
capital companies, timing of investments is a risk factor that refers to the time diversification of 
investments throughout the venture capital fund’s investment period. Lack of time diversity in 
investments exposes a venture capital fund’s portfolio to risks deriving from macroeconomic and 
industry specific cycles and transitions, such as bubbles, financial crises and systemic risks. A 
venture capital fund’s targeted stage of investment describes at which stage of a company’s 
development cycle the fund is financing. Funds that focus only on one specific funding stage carry 
increased portfolio risk due to the similar risk-profiles between companies that are in the same 
development stage. (Feld et al 2017; Proksch et al. 2016; http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu 2003) 
 
Sector allocation strategy is another significant risk factor in a venture capital portfolio; limiting a 
fund’s investing to a specific industry has the potential to either increase or reduce the overall 
portfolio risk, largely depending on the industry expertise and experience of the venture capital 
company’s general partners and investment managers. Venture capital companies with special 
industry-related expertise, skills and knowledge are able to affect both sides of the risk-reward ratio 
for their portfolio investments. They are able manage company-specific risks by possessing and 
exploiting particular information about a specific sector or industry, giving them a competitive 
advantage over other non-specialized venture capital companies. Furthermore, by taking advantage 
of the industry-specific networks that they have built, specialized venture capital companies are 
able to grow their returns to increase the likelihood and value of a successful exit. However, 
specializing in particular industries exposes a fund’s portfolio to industry specific risks which can 
outweigh the benefits gained from the specialization. These industry risks arise from factors such 
as overall industry growth prospects, new competing technologies, regulatory changes and industry 
cyclicality. (Bartkus & Hassan 2009; Wüstenhagen & Teppo 2004) 
 
A venture capital fund’s geographical allocation of investments also influences the total amount of 
risk its portfolio carries. A geographically concentrated portfolio is more vulnerable to country 
risks, which include political risk, exchange-rate risk and economic risk. In addition to 
concentration risk, geographical distance between a venture capital company’s fund and its 
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portfolio companies can have an impact on the fund’s agency risk. The flow of information among 
the portfolio company and the venture capital company is reduced and slowed down by a long 
physical distance; this hinders the venture capital company’s ability to monitor and support the 
business, thus potentially increasing agency risk and missing some of the possible upside that a 
closer working relationship could have created. (Chen at al 2010; Mason 2007) 
 
As well as the aforementioned concentration risks of time, sector and geography, the number of 
investments in a portfolio is a significant factor of the total portfolio risk. A small number of 
investments in a portfolio creates a large risk exposure to individual portfolio companies and lowers 
the probability of finding highly successful ventures that can generate returns that exceed the 
original investment by several multiples. However, correspondingly, a large amount of investments 
limits the venture capital company’s capability to actively monitor and support all of its portfolio 
companies. According to a study conducted on 214 venture capital funds, the average amount of 
investments in a venture capital portfolio is approximately 20 companies. (Cummings 2006)   
 
2.1.4 Risks associated with investment exits 
 
The final stage of a venture capital company’s operational cycle is a process that includes 
liquidating the fund’s remaining investments, calculating the fund’s total return on investment and 
returning the remaining capital, deducted by the venture capital company’s cut, to the fund’s limited 
partners and finally dissolving the fund. The liquidation stage of a venture capital fund commences 
when the fund’s investment term comes to an end, typically after ten to twelve years from the fund’s 
initial call of capital. Unless the fund’s limited partners agree to extend the term of the fund, the 
venture capital company is forced to liquidate all the remaining investments in the fund’s portfolio. 
Bhattacharya and Ince (2015) found in their study that the finite lifespan of venture capital funds 
causes exit pressure as the funds get closer to expiration; according to the study, businesses backed 
by venture capital funds that are nearing the end of their lifespan are exited more quickly, 
suggesting that the finite lifespan of venture capital funds is driving venture capital companies to 
exert substantial pressure on fund portfolio companies’ management teams to pursue a company 
sale. (Feld et al 2017; Schwienbacher 2009) 
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The two primary investment liquidation options for venture capital companies, often called 
investment exits, are acquisition and initial public offering. Liquidation through acquisition occurs 
when a portfolio company, or majority of its ownership, is sold to another company. When the 
transaction is completed the portfolio company ceases to exist in a legal meaning and becomes part 
of the acquirer’s organization. The other main option for liquidating an ownership stake in a 
portfolio company is to conduct an initial public offering. Through this process a privately-held 
portfolio company initiates a public offering in which shares of the company are sold on a public 
stock exchange to institutional and retail investors. After the initial public offering has been 
completed, shares of the portfolio company are freely traded on the open market and the previously 
privately-held company has transformed into a public company. (Feld et al 2017; Ramsinghani 
2014; Schwienbacher 2009) 
 
In addition to the options of selling or taking a portfolio company public, other alternative 
liquidation methods for a venture capital company include selling the shares owned by its fund on 
secondary markets, entrepreneur buying back the shares from the fund, venture capital company 
forcing the portfolio company to repurchase the shares by exercising redemption rights and the 
portfolio company filing for bankruptcy in order for the venture capital fund to write off the 
investment. These alternative liquidation strategies are rarely used by venture capital companies to 
monetize a profitable investment; rather, they are used to dispose of unsuccessful investments. 
(Feld et al 2017; Ramsinghani 2014; Schwienbacher 2009) 
 
When a venture capital company has managed to liquidate all of its investments in a fund, it 
calculates the total return of the fund in order to determine its own share of the profits. Provided 
that the fund has was able to generate positive total return, the venture capital company typically 
receives 20% share of the profits, known as the carried interest. If a venture capital company has 
received a share of the profits early in the life of a fund, it faces a risk of clawback in the event that 
subsequent investments generate negative returns. A clawback provision written in a limited 
partnership agreement ensures that limited partners receive their agreed-upon share of a fund’s total 
return, but simultaneously creates a significant risk for the venture capital company due to the 
impossibility of predicting what the overall fund return will be at the end of the fund’s investment 
term. The risk of overdistribution of profits is most likely to occur if the early successful 
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investments of a venture capital fund are later followed by unsuccessful investments that offset the 
previously made profits. As a result of overdistribution, the limited partners have the right to 
demand the shortfall amount from the fund managers at the final liquidation of the fund. (Feld et 
al 2017; Landström & Mason 2012) 
 
In addition to clawback risk, the liquidation process of venture capital portfolio investments 
inherently involves several significant risks that are related to agency issues, market conditions, 
timing of liquidation and method of liquidation. As with agency risk during the investment period 
and investment term, differing objectives between a venture capital investor and an entrepreneur 
regarding the timing and method of liquidation can lead to an agency conflict between the two 
parties. Because of limited fund lifespan, venture capital companies are not long-term investors 
and thus, in general, have a different time horizon and business perspective for their investments 
than company founders. These agency conflicts are likely to create additional barriers that may 
hinder or prevent optimal exit for the venture capital company. Moreover, a disagreement between 
the venture capital company and the entrepreneur about liquidation can have a negative effect on 
the portfolio company’s operations and decision-making process which can further complicate the 
liquidation process. (Schwienbacher 2009) 
 
The condition of financial markets and the timing of the liquidation are a critical part of a venture 
capital company’s liquidation process, and can pose a significant risk to its successful completion. 
Premature efforts to push for liquidation can lead to weak buyer interest and a low company 
valuation, whereas starting the liquidation process too late raises the risk of an unfavorable shift in 
market dynamics that impairs the portfolio company’s valuation. For instance, delayed liquidation 
may cause the potential buyers or investors to lose their interest due to new competitors or 
competing solutions entering the market. Furthermore, liquidating investments during adverse 
market conditions creates an increased risk of either an unsuccessful liquidation process or non-
optimal valuation. The method of liquidation also affects the risks associated with liquidation 
timing; liquidation through an initial public offering or acquisition are both affected by market 
conditions, but, in general, initial public offerings are more sensitive to changes in market 
conditions. (Gillain 2016; Ramsinghani 2014; Schwienbacher 2009) 
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Besides market conditions, the method of liquidation has an integral part in many of the risks 
involved in the liquidation process. The two most common ways of liquidation for venture capital-
funded companies, an acquisition or initial public offering, both have a distinct set of risks that can 
significantly influence the likelihood of a successful liquidation of a portfolio investment. The key 
difference between the two methods is that acquisitions offer a faster, less expensive and lightly 
regulated liquidation process, whereas initial public offerings require a lengthy and expensive 
offering process and favorable market conditions for a successful investment liquidation. However, 
if a portfolio company is mature enough, has the required resources and the financial markets are 
in a suitable condition, a liquidation through an initial public offering is likely to generate higher 
returns compared to an acquisition. (Gillain 2016; Ramsinghani 2014) 
 
Acquisitions are the preferred method of liquidation for most venture capital companies due to their 
speed and efficiency, but at the same time they involve several notable risks that may lead to an 
unsuccessful liquidation process or non-optimal valuation. These risks include hiring an ineffective 
investment banker to oversee the liquidation process, parties that pretend to be potential buyers but 
in reality are only seeking information or trying to slow down the sale process and signing a letter 
of intent that has inadequate protective terms for the portfolio company. Additionally, the letter of 
intent contains several other terms, including representations and warranties, earn-outs and 
escrows, form of consideration and indemnities offered by the seller, which may have a 
considerable impact on the liquidation process and its risks. Representations and warranties are the 
facts and assurances about the portfolio company’s business that the seller gives to the acquirer; if 
these terms are breached, either the company being acquired or its shareholders, depending on the 
terms, are required to pay a pre-agreed indemnity to the acquirer. Earn-outs are contractual 
provisions that require the portfolio company to achieve predetermined performance targets after 
the completion of an acquisition in order to receive the full purchase price. In the event that the 
targets are not reached, the acquirer will keep the earn-out sum, which directly affects the total 
return a venture capital fund and other shareholders receive from the sale. (Feld et al 2017; Gillain 
2016; Ramsinghani 2014) 
 
An escrow provision defines a certain percentage or amount of the purchase price that is held by a 
third party for a pre-agreed period on behalf of the transacting parties to satisfy any issue that might 
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arise post acquisition that has not been disclosed in the purchase agreement. An escrow provision 
will decrease a portfolio company’s purchase price should any claim be brought under it, therefore 
the size and other terms of the escrow are an important risk factor for the seller. The form of 
consideration determines in what form the purchase price is paid; in most cases it can be either 
cash, acquirer’s stock or a combination of the two. Cash payment is typically the preferred option 
for the seller due to its liquidity and relatively low volatility, whereas stock consideration can be 
highly illiquid and volatile, largely depending on the size of the acquirer and if it is a publicly- or 
privately-held company. All-cash transactions are particularly important for venture capital 
companies due the limited life span of venture capital funds and the fact that fund returns are 
calculated by using the internal rate of return. (Feld et al 2017)   
 
The initial public offering is generally regarded as the most successful and most profitable 
liquidation method for shareholders and entrepreneurs alike. If a portfolio company meets all the 
listing requirements, has a successful business and the stock market is favorable, an initial public 
offering, out of all the liquidation methods, has the potential to generate the highest returns. (Bascha 
& Walz 2001) However, similar to the acquisition, the initial public offering carries several risks 
regarding the liquidation process. Market conditions and their sudden changes are one of the 
primary risk factors for unsuccessful or low-priced initial public offerings. The volatile nature of 
the stock market and the expensive, complex and time-consuming preparations for the initial public 
offering may lead to a situation where business and market conditions change radically before the 
initial public offering process is completed. If the change is adverse, the offering may have to be 
completely cancelled or the issue price has to be lowered in order to prevent an undersubscribed 
offering. (Feld et al 2017; Gillain 2016) 
 
A lock-up period is another significant risk factor for venture capital companies and other investors 
who have made their investment before the initial public offering. Most initial public offerings 
include a lock-up provision, which is a caveat placed on insiders and pre-initial public offering 
investors that prevents them from selling their shares for a predetermined period of time after the 
portfolio company has gone public, typically lasting four to six months. As a result, the owners of 
the stock subject to the lock-up period are exposed to changes in business and market conditions 
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and to the risk of decline in share price, which, if occurred, results in a reduced internal rate of 
return for the pre-initial public offering investors. (Feld et al 2017; Gillain 2016) 
 
2.2 Risk management techniques in venture capital financing 
 
Venture capital investing is characterized by the extreme volatility in the outcomes of investments 
and in the returns of venture capital funds. By making investments only in startup businesses, 
venture capital companies are taking enormous amounts of risk without any certainty of future 
returns. As a result of the severe investment risks and volatility of fund returns, extensive 
management of risks is one of the main activities of venture capital companies. Various different 
risk management techniques are employed by venture capital companies in order to identify, 
evaluate, control and monitor the various risk involved in individual investments, as well as 
portfolio- and company-wide risks. Of all the risk management techniques, diversification of 
investments is the most crucial part of venture capital risk management; a well-diversified venture 
capital portfolio not only reduces company specific risks and concentration risks, but in addition, 
the large amount of portfolio companies increases the likelihood of making an investment in a 
company that becomes extremely successful and generates extraordinarily high returns. Other 
frequently used venture capital risk management techniques include pre-screening and due 
diligence, financial contracting, syndication, staged financing, management and board selection, 
monitoring and industry specialization. (Proksch et al. 2016; Kut et al. 2007; O. Fiet 1995) 
 
2.2.1 Portfolio diversification 
 
Due to the fact that approximately seventy percent of startups fail in the first ten years of operation, 
a venture capital portfolio has to be built differently compared to other investment portfolios, such 
as public equity portfolios or fixed income portfolios (www.bls.gov 2016). High failure risk of 
individual investments drives venture capital companies to diversify their funds’ portfolios in order 
to reduce portfolio company-related risks, as well as industry and stage-related risks. The benefits 
of portfolio diversification in venture capital investing have been confirmed in several studies 
which have documented a positive relationship between venture capital fund diversification and 
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performance (Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Knill, 2009; Lossen, 2009). In addition, Buchner et al 
(2017) conducted a study that showed that greater diversification reduces fund risk, making 
possible for risk-averse managers to select riskier investments, and thus, investments with higher 
expected returns. However, the scope of diversification is restricted in terms of number of 
investments due venture capital companies’ limited resources to actively monitor and support all 
their portfolio companies. The trade-off between portfolio size and effectively assisting portfolio 
companies to grow their businesses is a complex risk factor that depends largely on each respective 
venture capital company’s value-adding capabilities. (Buchner et al 2017; Cressy et al 2012) 
 
Portfolio diversification does not only refer to increasing the amount of individual investments in 
a portfolio, but it can also be implemented through industry, stage and geographical diversification. 
Diversifying portfolio investments across multiple industries reduces industry-specific risk, 
whereas diversification through stage of development reduces the portfolio’s exposure to risks that 
are specific to different investment stages such as seed-, early-, growth- and late-stage. 
Geographical diversification, in turn, means spreading portfolio investments across different 
geographic regions in order to reduce country-specific risks and source new investments. 
Broadening portfolio diversification along at least one of these dimensions faces the same trade-
off as diversification through growing the number of portfolio companies; if fund managers have 
to monitor existing investments and focus on making investments in multiple investment stages, 
industries and geographical areas, it is possible that the benefits gained through the reduced 
portfolio concentration risk are partially or completely offset by the negative effects of the over-
diversification. (Buchner et al 2017; Cressy et al 2012) 
 
2.2.2 Due diligence process 
 
Due diligence is a series of processes and activities that are combined together in order to evaluate 
an investment proposal by detecting and analyzing its most important risks and potential upside. 
An effective due diligence process increases a venture capital company’s probability of identifying 
successful investments and avoiding investments that are not able to generate high enough returns. 
The process is designed to reduce the investor’s risk by understanding the possible issues and 
challenges embedded in a potential investment. Furthermore, a formal due diligence process 
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enables a venture capital company to review higher volumes of investment opportunities and 
accelerates deal execution. A formal and clearly defined due diligence process is established by 
creating a company-wide due diligence strategy that determines the criteria for screening and 
evaluating potential investments. This strategy is based on the investment philosophy and criteria 
of the venture capital company and it defines how the process is structured to address specific risk 
factors. (Ramsinghani 2014; De Cleyn et al 2007; http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu 2003) 
 
The due diligence process can be broken down into two distinct phases, an initial screening of the 
deal and a more detailed evaluation that aims to determine the suitability of a deal before moving 
to the next phase in which the valuation and deal structure is negotiated. The intent of screening 
phase is to quickly identify the deals that either do not fit with the investment criteria of the 
company or do not possess the qualities that are considered necessary for success. Each venture 
capital company sets its own screening criteria to match its investment and due diligence strategies, 
although there are a few characteristics that are commonly used as a screening criteria for venture 
capital investments. These typical screening criteria include investment stage and size, industry 
sector, geographic location, product, market and management. In the event that an investment 
proposal passes the screening phase, it moves to the due diligence phase, where the potential of the 
deal is verified through a deeper analysis. Often the due diligence criteria which are evaluated are 
similar to those used in the screening criteria but in greater depth. This means that the assumptions 
made during the screening phase need to be further investigated and verified during the due 
diligence phase. As a result, most often the main purpose of due diligence is to test the robustness 
and reliability of the information obtained during the screening process. (De Cleyn et al 2007; 
http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu 2003) 
 
2.2.3 Financial contracting 
 
Designing specialized financial contracts is a central part venture capital risk management. Due to 
the severe information asymmetries and agency problems of early-stage growth companies, 
financial contracting has a key role in the investment decision-making process. Optimal contracting 
alleviates agency-related risks, provides transparency and ensures that the incentives of the 
entrepreneur and the venture capital investor are aligned. In addition, contracts can be used in order 
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to ensure compliance with previously defined control mechanisms, responsibilities, tasks and 
outcomes. Most of the financial contracts that venture capital companies use are some form of 
convertible preferred equity. Venture capital investors demand these preferred shares in order to 
reduce risks, create downside protection, maximize investment returns and gain advantages in a 
variety of situations. (Burchardt et al. 2016; Bratton 2002) 
 
Venture capital contracting, in general, has two main factors that govern all contracting: economics 
and control. The term economics refers to the return that an investor receives in a liquidity event, 
such as an acquisition or initial public offering, and the contractual terms that directly impact this 
return. (Feld et al 2017) Well-structured economics terms allow a venture capital investor to make 
follow-on investments and increase its ownership of a venture that is progressing favorably, or, in 
the opposite situation, minimize the risks and potential downside in order to recoup as much as 
possible of the original investment. The terms that make up the economics of an investment 
agreement include valuation, liquidation preference provisions, right of first refusal, redemption 
rights, pay-to-play provisions, vesting of options and stock, employee option pool and anti-dilution 
provisions. From risk management perspective, particularly valuation, liquidation preference 
provisions and anti-dilution provisions are able to provide a significant downside protection if 
negotiated so that they favor the investor. (Burchardt et al. 2016; Ramsinghani 2014) 
 
The second main factor of venture capital contracting, control, refers to the mechanisms that allow 
an investor to either exercise control over the portfolio company or to veto a specific business 
decision. Venture capital companies typically hold minority interest positions in their portfolio 
companies, but through proper control terms they effectively gain control of many activities of their 
portfolio companies. The most essential control terms comprise board of directors, protective 
provisions, drag-along rights and conversion of shares. These contractual rights minimize a venture 
capital company’s investment risks, protect against downside and aim to amplify the potential 
upside of a portfolio company. (Feld et al 2017) 
 
2.2.4 Syndication 
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Syndication is another method that venture capital companies use to diversify their portfolios and 
reduce risks related to individual investments. In venture capital investing, syndication refers to an 
investment strategy where multiple venture capital companies, or other investors such as angel and 
corporate investors, share an investment opportunity by joining together and forming an investment 
syndicate. Most venture capital syndicates have a lead investor, who usually negotiates the 
investment terms for the entire syndicate (Feld et al 2017). Co-operation via syndication is a 
frequent feature of the venture capital industry. Of the approximately 30,000 companies that 
received venture capital funding between 1980 and 2005, about 70% received investments from 
two or more venture capital investors. (Tian 2011) 
 
Syndicating investments provides a venture capital company with several advantages that reduce 
its portfolio company specific risks and increase the likelihood of finding and funding successful 
ventures. First, syndication enables a means of sharing risk on a deal-by-deal basis, which can 
reduce overall portfolio risk due to a more diversified investment portfolio. The scope for both 
syndicating out deals to other investors as well as syndicating into deals sourced by other investors 
also gives the venture capital company access to a wider amount of diverse investments. Second, 
syndication helps identifying, evaluating and confirming investment risks through participation of 
other investors. Different investors typically have varying perspectives and opinions, which can 
help reduce adverse selection risks because investment opportunities and potential follow-on 
investments are reviewed by multiple independent observers in the syndicate. In effect, independent 
venture capital companies or other investors in the syndicate might screen investments more 
effectively than just a single venture capital company, because each investor learns something from 
the evaluations made by other partners in the syndicate. Moreover, having multiple syndication 
partners often increases the depth of the due diligence process, and thus improves the investment 
decision process, reduces investment risk and increases the chances of success. (Antweiler et al 
2002; Manigart et al 2002; Lockett & Wright 2001) 
 
The third advantage of venture capital syndication concerns the assistance and guidance of portfolio 
companies. A syndicate formed by venture capital companies that have differing skills, 
information, networks and industry expertise can provide a startup company with a broad range of 
important financial and business inputs.  Some venture capital companies may be more capable in 
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screening investments and thus are able to invest larger sums in riskier and more R&D intensive 
companies that take a long time to achieve profitability, whereas other venture companies may 
have more extensive networks to assist startup companies to recruit new key employees, develop 
customer relations and find suppliers. Furthermore, some venture capital companies can bring 
additional value to the syndicate by providing abundant financial resources and a degree of security 
for startup companies. Finally, venture capital companies that are fully owned by corporations may 
possess superior knowledge, expertise and relationships in certain industries in which the corporate 
venture capital company’s parent company operates. (Tian 2011; Antweiler et al 2002) 
 
2.2.5 Staged financing 
 
One of the key characteristics in venture capital investing is staging the commitment of capital and 
retaining the possibility to abandon a venture in case it does not perform or grow according to 
expectations. Staged financing is widely used in seed- and early-stage investments to control risks 
and mitigate issues caused by moral hazard. When using staged financing, instead of providing a 
large amount of capital upfront, a venture capital company invests in stages in order to keep the 
portfolio company portfolio under control. Typically before any subsequent funding takes place 
after the initial investment stage, the portfolio company has to meet goals defined by its investors. 
As a result of these predetermined milestones, staged investments technique allows a venture 
capital company to monitor its portfolio companies’ performance before it decides to make follow-
on investments. This information acquired through monitoring helps the venture capital company 
to avoid making large upfront investments in unsuccessful ventures, and thus reduces its total 
investment risk. Additionally, staged financing has the potential to significantly diminish agency 
risks related to investing, since it enables effective monitoring and develops a multi-period financial 
relationship which can be terminated at the venture capital company’s discretion. (Giat 2005; Wang 
& Zhou 2004) According to Sahlman (1990), moral hazard related issues, such as entrepreneurs 
using invested capital enrich themselves, shirking job responsibilities or continuing a project that 
has negative expected profits, are best controlled through the use of staged financing.   
 
The implementation of staged financing can be accomplished by setting specific milestones or by 
using various forms of equity, convertible securities and debt. For instance, when staged financing 
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is done through a convertible note, the investment is initially made in the form of debt, but the 
venture capital investor has a right to convert the loan into shares at any time. The main idea behind 
using convertible notes and other hybrid securities is that the venture capital company has the 
option to halt making further investments at any time after the initial investment. (Wang & Wang 
2009) When staged financing is implemented as a milestone progression, multiple different goals 
can be used to measure a venture is performing. For example, completion of a prototype, signing a 
major partnership, reaching a certain user amount or validation from an important customer are a 
few milestones that are normally used to structure staged financing. As a portfolio company builds 
its business and reaches various milestones, it usually requires ever-increasing investment rounds 
to scale its organization, increase capital expenditures, accelerate sales and conduct product 
development. However, at the same time the cost of capital to the venture capital company 
decreases as the rounds grow, due to lower risks associated with more accurate forecasts of future 
revenues and earnings. If a venture capital company, which participated in the initial financing 
round, is not able or willing to participate in the subsequent larger financing round on a pro rata 
basis, the venture capital company will lose some or all of their preferential rights in case the 
investment agreement had a pay-to-play provision. (Giat 2005; Plummer 1987) 
 
2.2.6 Selection of the board and management 
 
The board of directors wields the greatest influence over a portfolio company’s future direction, 
which includes oversight of identification, evaluation, mitigation and monitoring all critical risks. 
Hence, securing a board seat at a portfolio company is gives a venture capital company direct 
influence over corporate decisions. Additionally, venture capital investors serving on portfolio 
company boards, either as directors or observers, receive proprietary and material information 
about the company’s business. The primary role of a board member comprises: (a) create, sustain 
and enhance shareholder value, (b) evaluate CEO’s performance and future vision for the company, 
assist in recruitment and succession planning, (c) manage risks through business strategy, market 
insights, finance and legal compliance. (Ramsinghani 2014) A competent board of directors helps 
a portfolio company to successfully attract customers, build effective distribution channels, achieve 
strong cash flow and seize a solid competitive position from early on. Furthermore, a competent 
board ensures that adequate risk mitigation is integrated into all the aforementioned operations.  
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3 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter of the study explains the chosen methodological approach and the reasons why it was 
chosen based on the aim of the study. Additionally, the chapter highlights certain methodological 
limitations that are present in the research. The main objective of the study was to understand what 
kind of risks are included in the operations of a venture capital company and what tools and 
methods venture capital companies are using to control and mitigate these risks. Literature review 
revealed that most venture capital risk management studies mostly focus on individual risks or risk 
management methods, whereas research conducted on the overall company-wide risk management 
of a venture capital company has been relatively scarce. Furthermore, majority of the existing 
studies are conducted by using a quantitative research method. This study seeks to contribute to 
this less researched area by utilizing a qualitative research method and an interpretive research 
model. In addition, justification for the choice of using qualitative method in this research also 
stems from the fact that the chosen approach allowed the researcher to explore the topics and 
themes relevant to the study more in-depth compared to what would have been possible with 
quantitative research methods. In order to achieve the goals of the study, research was conducted 
using semi-structured interviews which enabled examination of the topics of the study from various 
points of view.  
 
3.1 Research instrument design 
 
The interview questionnaire used in the interviews serves as the primary research instrument in this 
study. In this study, the questions in the interview questionnaire pursued to investigate the risks 
faced by venture capital companies and what measures venture capital companies take to manage 
these risks. In order to create an independent interview questionnaire, the questions were based on 
common risks and risk management methods found both in studies concerning venture capital 
investing and literature about venture capital risk management. Furthermore, a question about risk 
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management strategy was also included to the interview questionnaire in order to find out how 
systematically interviewees organized their risk management standards and operations. The 
interview questions were designed to be semi-structured and open-ended so that it would be 
possible to gain in-depth information about the topics of the interview and to have the option to 
further explore any of the topics.  
 
3.2 Sample and participants   
 
The sample size on this study was four. The size of the sample is moderately small, but due to the 
qualitative approach of the study and resource constraints, it was deemed appropriate. The 
participants of this study were partners and employees in venture capital companies and other 
investment companies that had at least one active venture capital fund under their management. 
Additionally, all of the participants had one or more offices in Finland. All of the participants were 
selected so that the sample would be as representative as possible and provide rich information 
about the risk management related matters that are of central importance to the purpose of the study.  
 
3.3 Data collection 
 
Venture capital companies and other investment companies that had at least one active venture 
capital fund were initially contacted via email to introduce the study to them and to ask if they 
would be interested in participating in the research. The email provided an introduction to the thesis 
project, and explained what the interview included and how the interview process was structured. 
In addition, the main questions of the interview and an unfinished version of the theory section of 
the study were attached to the email in order to give the respondents a better understanding of the 
study’s objectives and content. If a respondent agreed to participate, a date and time for the 
interview were set. 
 
The interviews were conducted over the phone in Finnish. The main reason for conducting the 
interviews over the phone was to save resources, such as time and money, and to offer the 
interviewees a convenient way to participate in the study. A voice recording software was used 
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during the interviews with the consent of participants in order to ensure that all the information 
revealed during the interviews was recorded for the purpose of subsequent data analysis. The 
confidentiality of both the whole study and the interview recording was assured before the actual 
interview was started. A total of four interviews, all of which lasted approximately an hour, were 
conducted during the course of the study. After the interviews were completed, the audio records 
of the interviews were transcribed into Microsoft Word documents. Any real names, company 
details or personal details were removed from the finished transcripts.    
 
3.4 Data analysis 
 
Data analysis of the interviews was conducted by carefully examining the transcribed interviews 
on the basis of principles derived from thematic analysis. The approach of the analysis was 
interpretative in order to explore the interview data in a manner that would yield relevant in-depth 
insights about the subject matter of venture capital risk management. According to the principles 
of thematic analysis, the large amount of data from the interviews was grouped and transformed 
into manageable coded categories by identifying recurring risk management themes and issues that 
presented similar patterns. The focus of the data categorization was on organizing and coding the 
data into categories based on key risks and risk management methods, as well as establishing new 
conceptual elements and developments associated with venture capital risk management.  
 
3.5 Reliability, validity and limitations of the study 
 
The research process followed an interview questionnaire and a standardized interview procedure 
to ensure internal validity and reliability of the study. The questions used in the interview 
questionnaire were created based on previous studies and academic literature in order to increase 
the reliability and validity of the study. However, external validity of the study is limited due to the 
nature of the study, as qualitative research method does not typically seek to generalize its findings, 
but instead stays close to the empirical world and creates studies of the real world. Furthermore, it 
is not possible to achieve perfect reliability when a study focuses on real life situations.   
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Additional to the general approach of qualitative methodology, this research project also contains 
three other relevant methodological limitations. First, despite of the both standardized interview 
questionnaire and procedure, researcher’s interviewing skills may have had an impact on the quality 
of the gathered data when conducting the interviews. Second, the small sample of venture capital 
investors is unlikely to represent the entire population of venture capital investors in a global or 
Finnish extent. Third, the analysis and interpretation of data are strongly dependent on the 
knowledge, skills and experience of the researcher.    
 
 
4 INTERVIEW ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 
This chapter presents the findings and results of the interviews that were conducted in order to 
study how venture capital companies view risks and how they incorporate risk management 
processes in their operations. As previously stated, thematic analysis was used to analyze the data, 
and thus the findings are categorized based on the interview questionnaire’s structure, which was 
created to reflect the categorization presented in the theory section of this study. The chapter is 
comprised of two main categories: (a) risks associated with venture capital investing and (b) risk 
management methods associated with venture capital investing. These two main categories are 
broken down into same subcategories, excluding the formal risk management strategy subchapter, 
as in the theory section, enabling accurate comparison between the data collected from the 
interviews and the data compiled from previous studies and academic literature. 
 
The analysis of the collected data is based on the interviews with the selected venture capital 
investors and exclusively studies their responses to the questions presented about risks and risk 
management methods. The analysis also identifies other trends and issues that are strongly 
connected to different aspects of venture capital risk management. The total amount of data 
collected during the interviews was relatively large, which resulted in a situation where not all of 
the collected data was relevant. Thus, the focus of the analysis was on data that was relevant in 
answering the main research question and related sub-questions of the study. 
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4.1 The use of formal risk management strategy in venture capital investing 
 
The first question presented to the interview respondents was aimed to map out if their companies 
have a formal risk management strategy that encompasses and governs all of their operations. Due 
to a very scarce amount of information available regarding the use of a formal upper-level risk 
management strategy in venture capital companies, this question does not have a corresponding 
subsection in the theory section. However, similarly as with minimal literature about formal risk 
management strategy in venture capital companies, the interviews found out that none of the 
companies represented by the interview respondents had comprehensive and governing formal risk 
management strategies in place. Instead, all of the respondents had one or multiple risk 
management strategies, frameworks or mechanisms that they were actively using to identify, 
evaluate, control and monitor risks in their investment operations. Some of the interviewed 
companies organized their risk management operations on a fund level according to each fund’s 
rules, whereas others used either single or multiple company level principles that were the basis of 
all of their investment risk management activities.  
   
Most of the respondents had a standardized risk management framework that they were using to 
evaluate an individual investment’s risks and potential. In most cases this framework mostly 
consisted of a static checklist which had the same inspection points for all potential investments. 
Several respondents explained that these static lists had been compiled through years of experience, 
and that they do not alter them between different types of startup companies in order to ensure 
consistency in their screening processes. Moreover, standardized checklists were used by all of the 
respondents to quickly and cost-effectively process and screen the large amounts of investments 
proposals that they were receiving from startup companies who were looking for funding.  
 
4.2 Risks associated with venture capital investing 
 
This section of the chapter presents the findings and results of the risk portion of the conducted 
interviews. The risk portion consisted of the four following operational phases of a venture capital 
fund: (a) raising a fund, (b) investing the fund’s capital, (c) managing the fund’s portfolio and 
making follow-on investments and (d) exiting investments and dissolving the fund. Additionally, 
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the interviewees were also asked if they were aware of other venture capital investing related risks 
that were not necessarily directly connected to any of the traditional phases of a venture capital 
fund. The results of this fifth question are presented in the ‘other risks’ section of this subchapter. 
 
4.2.1 Risks in raising a venture capital fund 
 
All of the interview respondents identified the risk of failing to reach the first close of a fund as the 
most important risk during the process of raising a venture capital fund. This result is line with 
previous studies and venture capital literature, and is largely caused by the singular focus towards 
raising capital at this stage in a fund’s lifecycle. As a result of this single focus to close the fund, 
most of the risks in this stage are subordinate to the main risk of failing to reach the first close of 
the fund. The respondents had fairly identical opinions on what are the most significant subordinate 
risk factors for raising a fund. They included factors such as quality of the management team, 
investment strategy and the general condition of the financial markets. According to the 
interviewees, inexperienced management team with no track record or with a weak track record is 
one of the most important risk factors that affect the success rate of a successful fund close.  
 
Another significant risk factor was the investment strategy; not being able to differentiate from 
other funds or targeting challenging niche sectors and sectors where large amounts of capital had 
already been raised were seen as disadvantages in the capital raising process, and thus decreasing 
the likelihood of successfully closing a fund. Economic downturns and weak financial markets 
were also brought up by most of the respondents as a risk factors that often have a material impact 
on the risk of failing to close a fund. Some of the interviewees additionally mentioned the 
importance of finding an anchor investor to the fund whose presence in the fund gives it a certain 
level of validation in the eyes of other possible limited partners. Not being able to find this initial 
investor is a red flag to other investors, and therefore it has a direct correlation with the risk of not 
being able to raise enough capital to close the fund.   
 
4.2.2 Risks in making investments 
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Risks associated with the venture capital investment process were divided into the risks of the 
actual investment process, which includes sourcing, screening, due diligence and negotiating 
investment terms, and into risks inherent in the business operations of the investees. This separation 
was done in order to present a more comprehensive analysis on the actual investment process-
related risks; from a venture capital company’s perspective, the risks in the latter category are 
indirect risks, which only affect the venture capital company by impacting the valuation of their 
investments.  
 
During the interviews the respondents of the study brought up relatively varying views on the risks 
of the investment process. However, there were several investment process risks and risk factors 
that recurred in majority of the interviews. The two most important risks mentioned were the loss 
of time and money and reputational damage. Additionally, some of the respondents saw that weak 
deal-flow, resulting in limited amount of investment opportunities, was also a substantial risk 
associated with the investment process. The risk of losing time and money in the investment process 
was referred to inefficient and negligent screening and due diligence processes that are not fast and 
accurate enough to separate investments opportunities with high growth potential and acceptable 
risks from other investment opportunities that do not meet the set investment criteria. In addition 
to causing unnecessary waste of time and money, several interviewees pointed out that negligent 
due diligence process creates a risk of making investments in companies that have unidentified or 
incorrectly evaluated specific risks or agency risks, which, as previously mentioned, are indirect 
risks for the investor, and may have serious implications for investment returns. 
 
The risk of causing reputational damage during the investment process was likewise a notable risk 
for all of the interviewees. Treating startup entrepreneurs and potential investees in an inappropriate 
manner, such as procrastinating the investment decision or suddenly pulling out of a deal that is in 
due diligence stage without proper explanation, has a high risk of damaging the venture capital 
investor’s reputation among the startup and venture capital communities. Calculating the actual 
monetary value of damaged reputation is particularly difficult for venture capital companies, 
because in most situations the damage is manifested as reduced deal-flow and a decreased level of 
interest from startup companies looking for funding, as well as from other investors who are 
looking for co-investors in funding deals. Some of the respondents also saw that competing sources 
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of financing, such as product and equity crowdfunding, revenue financing and business loans, and 
poor deal sourcing processes are risk factors that have similar deal-flow impacting consequences 
as reputational damage. Moreover, they thought that a very broad generalist approach to investing 
or very strict investment specialization both bring their own set of risks to the investment process. 
Generalist approach has often potential for higher deal-flow, but has increased risk of inadequate 
due diligence when making investments in companies in highly complex industries. Conversely, 
very narrow specialization in specific industry or niche sector enables conducting deeper and more 
granular due diligence, but at the same time increases the risk of insufficient deal-flow. 
 
4.2.3 Risks in managing portfolio and making follow-on investments 
 
All of the interviewees had fairly identical views on the risks that venture capital investors face 
during the portfolio management phase and while making follow-on investments in portfolio 
companies. The general consensus was that this phase in a venture capital fund’s lifecycle involves 
mostly indirect risks which are related to individual portfolio companies’ business risks. However, 
certain operational risks were also mentioned, including negligent follow-on investment due 
diligence, inappropriate treatment of portfolio companies and careless investing of excess capital. 
The first two of the mentioned risks, negligent follow-on due diligence and inappropriate treatment, 
are highly identical and in most cases directly comparable to the due diligence and reputation risks 
that the interviewees brought up when they were asked about the risks in a venture capital fund’s 
investment phase. Careless investing of excess capital was explained as a risk factor that increases 
the possibility of making hasty investment decisions that are not thorough enough. In a situation 
where a fund’s investment period is nearing the end, or has already ended, and it still has a 
significant percentage of its committed capital left to invest, the fund managers might attempt to 
deploy the committed capital instead of telling their limited partners that they were not able to find 
enough investment opportunities to invest all of the fund’s committed capital. Attempting to invest 
large amounts of capital in a short time frame typically requires the venture capital investor to lower 
its investment criteria and conduct a shortened due diligence process, thus increasing the likelihood 
that the venture capital investor is not able to identify and properly evaluate all material risks before 
making an investment decision. Furthermore, according to several respondents, lowering the 
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investment criteria in order to reach higher deal volume or size forces the venture capital investor 
to also accept higher amounts of and more severe identified and evaluated risks. 
 
4.2.4 Risks in exiting investments and dissolving a fund    
 
Similarly as with the risks of portfolio management phase, most of the interviewees had quite 
similar opinions on the risks associated with exiting investments and liquidating a venture capital 
fund. The observations brought up in the interviews included pushing a portfolio company to an 
exit too early, disagreements between investors and founders about when to pursue an exit, and the 
risks of an exit through an initial public offering versus the risks of an exit through an acquisition. 
Several interviewees described that the risk of a premature exit typically emerges when a venture 
capital fund is approaching its target liquidation date, and as a result, the fund starts actively 
pursuing the liquidation of its remaining investments in order to be able to dissolve the fund and 
return the fund’s capital to its limited partners. If a portfolio company is not ready or properly 
aligned for an exit transaction, it is highly likely that the exit value of the company will be lowered 
substantially due to the rushed exit event. Furthermore, a portfolio company’s unpreparedness to 
an exit event may cause an ongoing exit process to fall through, which can put the company out of 
business if it does not have enough capital to continue to run its operations without the planned exit 
event, and the existing investors are not willing to invest more capital in the company. 
 
Disagreements among investors and founders about exit strategy, namely timing of the exit and 
what exit vehicle to choose, was another risk that was pointed out in the interviews. Disagreements 
and differing opinions about the best exit strategy can be formed either between investors 
themselves or between investors and founders of the company. Additionally, disagreement between 
the investors and founders can also concern how long the founders and management team have to 
work for the acquiring company post-acquisition. These disputes, as explained by the interviewees, 
can decrease the current valuation or a potential exit valuation of a portfolio company in several 
different ways, such as taking the founders and management team’s focus off the core business 
operations, preventing the sale of the company during a window of opportunity or hampering the 
company’s ability to raise additional capital.  
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During the interviews, the interviewees were also asked to compare the risks of an exit through an 
initial public offering versus the risks of an exit through an acquisition from a venture capital 
investor’s perspective. The results of this question were mixed; most of the interviewees saw that 
it is not possible to say which exit vehicle is absolutely better from risk management perspective, 
rather, the risk level of both an IPO and acquisition is highly dependent on a myriad situational 
factors, including the general condition of financial markets, industry and company specific factors, 
investor preferences, potential lock-up periods and other terms of the exit. 
 
4.2.5 Other risks     
 
The purpose of the last question regarding a venture capital company’s risks was to identify and 
examine those risks that are not necessarily directly tied to an individual venture capital fund’s 
lifecycle, but rather encompass the whole venture capital company and all of its operations, 
including all of its funds. The responses to this question were highly identical; the single most 
important risk identified was reputation risk, which was followed by somewhat less significant key 
person and cyber security risks. Majority of the interviewees divided the reputation risk into two 
different categories based on what stakeholder relationships are damaged. The first category 
included those reputation risks that, if occurred, damage the venture capital company’s reputation 
with its limited partners, whereas the reputation risks in the second category were comprised of 
those risks that have the potential to damage the venture capital company’s reputation with its 
portfolio companies, co-investors and the whole startup community. Furthermore, both of the 
categories have unique risk factors that influence the likelihood and severity of each respective 
category’s reputation risks. 
 
The interviews illustrated that in the case of reputation risks that are linked to limited partners, the 
most essential risk factor is the venture capital company’s capability to generate high enough 
returns for its limited partners. If a fund raised by a venture capital company clearly misses its 
targeted internal rate of return, it will most often severely impair the venture capital company’s 
ability to raise another fund and damage its reputation with existing and potential limited partners. 
The second category of reputation risks, linked to a venture capital company’s reputation with its 
portfolio companies, co-investors and the startup community, is mostly affected by how the venture 
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capital company manages its relationships with the aforementioned stakeholder groups. Behavior 
that is seen as unethical or immoral, such as dishonesty, opportunism and disrespect, is likely to 
cause substantial reputational damage with these groups, and consequently reduce the venture 
capital company’s deal-flow and access to other new investment opportunities. When the 
interviewees were asked if they prioritize one risk category over the other, approximately half of 
the interviewees emphasized the importance of the reputation risks concerning limited partners, 
while the other half did not see a major difference in importance between the two categories.          
 
Other entity level risks mentioned by the interviewees included key person risk, cyber security risk, 
currency risk and country risk. The interviewees had varying views on how important these risks 
are in a venture capital company’s core operations, for example, some of them saw cyber risks, 
such as data leaks and breaches, as a noteworthy risk, whereas other interviewees were not 
concerned about cyber risks and did not attempt to actively identify and manage them. The risk of 
currency fluctuations affecting exit returns or the risk of losing a key person were acknowledged 
and identified in majority of the interviewed venture capital companies and investment firms, but 
only a couple of them perceived them as threats that needed proactive risk management measures, 
such as using derivatives to hedge currency risk or key person insurance to compensate the financial 
losses caused by a key person’s death or extended incapacity. Country specific risks that are directly 
associated with the venture capital investor itself, such as adverse political and regulatory changes, 
were a focus point to some of the interviewees in their risk management efforts, but most of the 
interviewees saw them as fairly minor risks that do not have material implications for their core 
operations.  
 
4.3 Venture capital risk management methods 
 
In this section of the chapter the findings and results of the risk management portion of the 
conducted interviews are presented. The risk management segment of the interviews consisted of 
the eight following risk management methods: (a) portfolio diversification, (b) due diligence 
process, (c) financial contracting, (d) syndication, (e) staged financing, (f) selection of board and 
management team members, (g) monitoring of portfolio companies, and (h) specialization. 
Additionally, the interviewees were also asked if they were using some other risk management 
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methods to identify, evaluate, control and monitor risks in their operations in addition to the 
methods presented by the interviewer. The results of this question are presented in the ‘other risk 
management methods’ section of this subchapter. 
 
4.3.1 Portfolio diversification 
 
The first interview question regarding venture capital risk management methods involved 
diversification of investments as a risk management technique. The results were highly consistent; 
all of the interviewees strongly supported portfolio diversification and actively used it as a part of 
their risk management process. As previously stated in the theory section of this study and 
confirmed by the interviews, the unique nature of venture capital equity’s return distributions and 
the low survival rate of startup companies mean that diversification is a crucial part of all venture 
capital investing and risk management. However, creating a well-diversified venture capital 
portfolio requires a strong deal-flow that presents the venture capital investor with enough 
opportunities to invest in wide range of companies with different risk factors, such as industry, 
location and investment stage of a company. For the majority of the interviewees, the most 
important part of a successful diversification strategy was diversification of investments across 
different industries, sectors and vertical markets, followed by other diversification factors such as 
geography, time and investment stage. 
 
According to the interviews, diversifying investments across multiple industries, sectors and 
vertical markets enables venture capital investors to mitigate industry specific risks that their 
portfolio companies have. Additionally, adequate diversification balances and protects against the 
cyclical movements that are inherent in many of the industries and sectors that receive venture 
capital funding. Geographical diversification was actively used by some of the interviewees to 
reduce country risks, such as economic uncertainties, volatile political environments and 
unpredictable regulatory changes. However, in addition to risk management purposes, geographical 
diversification was also used to discover new lucrative investment opportunities and to expand 
business networks to new countries, cities and markets. Those interviewees who did not actively 
use geographic diversification, explained that they had decided to focus on mostly one or a couple 
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of countries due to their experience and understanding of local markets, culture and regulatory 
environment.            
 
4.3.2 Due diligence process 
 
The interviewees of the study were unanimous about the importance of a due diligence process as 
a part of a venture capital company’s risk management. Passing a thorough enough due diligence 
process was a requirement for all of their investments. The information collected in the interviews 
showed that all of the interviewees had somewhat varying views and principles about the process 
and purpose of investment due diligence. Factors such as fund size, investment thesis and the 
backgrounds of the fund’s general partners had a significant influence how interviewees structured 
and conducted their due diligence process. Larger funds with more generalist approach had deeper, 
more complex and slower due diligence than smaller highly specialized funds with general partners 
who are experts in their fund’s sector. The depth and length of the process was also dependent on 
the company that was subject to the due diligence process; seed-stage companies had significantly 
shorter and lighter due diligence compared to investments made in growth-stage and later-stage 
companies, which could take up to two months to complete the full process. 
 
However, the interviews revealed that there were certain aspects that most of the interviewees had 
implemented in their due diligence processes rather similarly. For example, the due diligence 
process was in most cases divided into two different parts, a screening process and a formal due 
diligence process, which both had different objectives in supporting an informed investment 
decision. The screening process was primarily used to assess the return potential and the most 
crucial risks of a proposed investment, whereas the formal due diligence process was used to 
confirm previously received information as well as to expose any undetected issues with the 
business or the founders. In addition to separating the due diligence process into two different 
phases, majority of the interviewees used third-party experts in the latter phase of the due diligence 
process to conduct legal, financial and technical due diligence. The purpose for using outside 
expertise was to ensure that any material risks or potential issues would not pass through the due 
diligence undetected because the venture capital investor did not have enough understanding or 
experience on certain subject matter, such as legal financial or technical audit.       
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4.3.3 Financial contracting 
 
As with diversification and due diligence, all of the interviewees expressed that proper contract 
terms are an essential part of their risk management procedures. However, the interviews showed 
that some of the investors gave more emphasis to carefully created investment agreements with 
robust provisions and clauses, while others attempted to use less contractual terms and focus more 
on building strong relationships and trust with their portfolio companies. The two most common 
provisions among the interviewees were vesting rights and liquidation preference. Additionally, 
drag-along rights, tag-along rights and redemption rights were also actively used by some of the 
interviewees in their investment agreements, while all of them preferred straight equity investments 
over investments made through convertible loan instruments. 
 
Multiple reasons were presented for the use of contractual provisions during the interviews, 
including the ability to steer and control portfolio companies, prevention of conflicts and disputes, 
incentivizing founders and key employees, and to clarify and facilitate exit events. Having a certain 
level of control or influence over a portfolio company’s decision-making and major strategic 
choices was an important aspect of contracting for all of the interviewed investors, although, as 
previously noted, some of the investors used looser controlling contract terms and avoided certain 
protective provisions completely in order to create trusting relationships with their portfolio 
companies. Another significant use for contractual terms was to prevent and quickly resolve any 
conflicts or disputes between the investors and founders or between the investors themselves. Many 
of the interviewees explained that these kind of internal issues can severely harm a portfolio 
company’s focus on building its business, cause unnecessary costs and even block a potential exit 
deal. As well as using contracting for controlling and preventing conflicts, all of the interviewees 
also used vesting provisions to motivate their portfolio companies’ founders and to align the 
interests between the both parties. A major reason for creating an appropriate founder vesting 
schedule was to reduce the risk of founders leaving, and mitigating the impact if it still happened.       
 
4.3.4 Syndication 
60 
 
 
Unlike the three previously presented venture capital risk management methods, syndication did 
not receive unanimous support from the interviewed investors as an essential risk management 
method. Nonetheless, all of the interviewees told that they actively participate in syndicates as part 
of their investment operations. The motives behind syndicating were mainly twofold: some of them 
saw syndication as an important way to diversify the risks associated with individual investments, 
whereas others deemed it as more of a method to collaborate and exchange information with other 
investors in the syndicate. Sharing some or all of the costs of due diligence process was also 
mentioned by some of the interviewees as a motivation for syndication, although it was not seen as 
important as the other two abovementioned main sources of motivation for syndication.    
 
Those interviewed investors who used syndicating mostly as a risk management method, were more 
likely to either start a syndicate or join a syndicate as the size of the investment increased. 
Syndication enabled them to make smaller and more diversified investments in later-stage 
companies that were raising large rounds of funding. As part of a syndicate, they were able to 
allocate less capital to individual investments, and thus participate in funding rounds that would 
have otherwise been too large and risky for them. As for the interviewees who saw syndication as 
a tool for collaboration and exchange of information, the decision to start or join a syndicate was 
in most cases resource and expertise-driven. The main purpose was to pool investor resources, 
including data, skills, contacts and subject-matter experts, in order to make a more informed 
investment decision and to support the growth of the syndicate’s investment. Furthermore, 
according to some of the interviewees, higher negotiating power of a syndicate gave them a stronger 
position in investment negotiations and more influence and control over an investee’s board of 
directors after the investment had been made.  
 
Syndication was also mentioned as an important channel for deal flow due to the fact that co-
investors in one syndicate often times offer each other opportunities to invest in other syndicated 
deals. In order to be able access this channel, it was essential to provide value to the syndicate and 
the investment, and to treat other syndicate members and the investee company with respect and 
integrity. However, many of the interviewees emphasized that, even though building good 
relationships with other syndicate members is an important opportunity to generate more 
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investment opportunities, making investments in a syndicate also introduces new risks due to the 
collective nature of a syndicate; every member of syndicate is an individual entity with its own 
interests, motivations and ways of operating. This means that one or more syndicate members might 
take actions or behave in a manner that is detrimental to the syndicate’s investment or its other 
members, either intentionally for its own benefit or unintentionally due to its ignorance or 
incompetence. In order to avoid and mitigate this co-investor risk, the interviewed investors 
assessed the quality and reputation of any potential co-investors before joining a syndicate or 
entering into a deal.  
 
4.3.5 Staged financing 
 
Out of all the risk management methods presented to the interviewees, staged financing proved out 
to be the most divisive. Half of the interviewees did not use staged financing in any form, while 
the other half were actively using it in their deals to manage investment risk. The answers of the 
interviewees indicated that the use of staged financing was connected to the size of the investor: 
large investors preferred making their investments in clearly defined and separate funding rounds, 
whereas smaller investors were in many cases dividing their investments in smaller installments 
that were disbursed either according to predefined milestones or entirely at the discretion of the 
investor. For the interviewees of the study, the main purpose of staging investments was to reduce 
investment risk by combining time diversification, continuous monitoring of investments and the 
option to discontinue funding. In practice, this meant that the investment sum was spread over a 
specified time period where the investor monitors the investment and makes periodic decisions 
about whether to continue or discontinue funding.  
 
Those interviewees who used staged financing to reduce their investment risk preferred in most 
cases not to set predefined milestones due to the constant changes and alterations which early-stage 
companies have to implement in order to find a viable business model and product-market fit. When 
staged financing was done without predefined milestones, the interviewees used different key 
performance indicators, such as revenue growth, cash burn, amount of users and market adoption 
to determine whether they should continue to fund a portfolio company. In addition to reducing 
investment risk, interviewees also explained that, as a result of not disbursing the funding in a single 
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tranche, staged investments provided them with more control and visibility into their portfolio 
companies. Investee companies were more motivated to be transparent and receive guidance from 
the investor when they were in a situation where they had to show adequate execution and progress 
in their business in order to receive the next tranche of capital. 
 
4.3.6 Selection of the board and management 
 
Being able to select members to the board of directors and to influence the selection of the executive 
management team was a significant risk management method for almost all of the interviewees. A 
board seat was so important right that many of the interviewed investors were not willing to invest 
without it. The person nominated to the board was in most cases either a general partner or an 
independent director familiar to the investor. The interviews indicated that the choice between 
placing a general partner or an independent director on the board of directors was connected to a 
portfolio company’s growth stage and size of the business; general partners were placed more often 
on early stage boards, whereas independent directors typically had board seats on more mature 
growth stage companies. The rationale behind nominating an independent director was to put an 
industry expert on the board who can help the portfolio company to grow the business, control 
industry related risks and avoid making mistakes typical to the portfolio company’s industry or 
market.  
 
The most important ways in which a seat on the board of directors contributed to the overall 
investment risk management was the opportunity to closely monitor what happens inside a portfolio 
company and steer the business towards desired direction. According to the interviewees who 
demanded a board seat, the risk of moral hazard was significantly reduced when they were able to 
place their own partner, employee or representative on the board of directors, due to the 
comprehensive access to a portfolio company’s information. Some of the interviewees also used 
their position on the board of directors to guide and instruct the respective portfolio company to 
implement proper risk management framework in order to control and manage threats such as 
liability and data protection risks.  
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4.3.7 Monitoring of portfolio companies 
 
The answers received to the question about monitoring of portfolio companies were very much 
aligned with the information presented in the theory section of this study, as all of the interviewed 
investor emphasized that continuous portfolio monitoring was an essential part of their investment 
operations and risk management. When observed particularly from the perspective of risk 
management, the purpose of monitoring was to provide actionable data to the venture capital 
investor on how a portfolio company’s existing risks are changing and if new risks have emerged 
after the initial due diligence process.  
 
The most common ways to conduct monitoring, in addition to board meetings, were weekly, 
monthly and quarterly meetings and reviews where the investment teams reviewed business factors, 
such as key performance indicators, latest business developments, risk maps, valuation and 
competitor and market analyses. Every interviewee had their own set of specific key performance 
indicators that they used in their monitoring process, but most of these indicators were 
predominantly used for monitoring revenue, sales, user traction, profitability and burn rate. For 
some of the interviewees, the frequency of monitoring was dependent on the performance of a 
portfolio company: if a portfolio company was executing at or above its projected performance, it 
did not require as much monitoring as a portfolio company which was not performing as projected.  
 
In addition to formal meetings and reviews, monitoring also occurred through different informal 
channels, including informal meetings, phone calls and emails between the investment team and 
the portfolio company. Several interviewees emphasized that part of their monitoring also included 
communication with regular employees in order to observe if the information received from the 
CEO and the executive team matched the information and observations that the employees had. 
Communicating across the whole organization, instead of only relying on the executive 
management, made possible to detect risks and uncertainties that the management was either 
unaware of or deliberately withholding from the investor.     
 
4.3.8 Specialization 
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Specializing in specific industries, verticals or markets was the least popular risk management 
method among the interviewed investors. Most of them thought that, as a risk management method, 
specialization meant deeper understanding of industry specific risks and how to control and 
mitigate them. However, most of the interviewees had a more or less generalist approach in their 
investing, which allowed them to have a more opportunistic investment strategy compared to a 
strict specialization strategy. This opportunity to make investments in a wide range of different 
sectors and fields was seen more beneficial in most cases than limiting the scope of investments 
only to those sectors where the investor had deep specialized industry knowledge. Several 
interviewees also noted that maintaining high-level knowledge of most venture capital backed 
industries requires a lot of time, resources and exposure to the industry in question. As a way to 
circumvent the problem of maintaining extensive industry knowledge, approximately half of the 
interviewees used outside consultants and industry experts in their due diligence process when they 
were considering making an investment in a company that operated in a sector, space or market 
that the investor did not know thoroughly enough. In addition to the initial due diligence, 
consultants and industry experts were also used in the later stages of the investment life cycle to 
provide assistance with examining available exit options for the investor.  
 
4.3.9 Other risk management methods 
 
The last question of the interview gave the interviewees an opportunity bring up any other risk 
management methods that were not presented in the previous questions. However, based on the 
answers received, the interviewed investors did not recognize other additional significant risk 
management methods in addition to the methods presented in the previous interview questions. A 
few less significant or irregularly used risk management methods and techniques were introduced, 
such as purchasing liability insurance, using the quality of investors interested in a potential 
investment as a risk indicator, and evaluating if a startup company has valuable intellectual property 
rights that can be sold in the event that the company turns out to be a failure.  
These methods were mostly introduced and used by individual interviewees, and did not have 
widespread adoption among all of the interviewees. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Startups and early-stage growth companies play an important part in economic growth and 
development all around the world; they create new jobs, products, services and business models 
that increase productivity and welfare. However, a vast majority of these companies initially burn 
more cash than what they generate when they are starting the business, and majority of them fail 
during the first five years from incorporation. This means that they need to raise capital to in order 
to finance business operations and growth, but at the same time the high risk of failure typically 
prevents these businesses from having access to debt funding. As a result, equity financing is the 
only option available for most startups and early-stage growth companies. The capital invested in 
these companies is called venture capital, and because these are highly risky investments which 
typically require a long time to mature and an extensive understanding of the respective company 
and the market it operates in, most of the venture capital investments are made by specialized 
financial institutions called venture capital companies. These investment entities focus solely on 
making investments in startups and early-stage growth companies, attempting to generate above-
market returns by taking higher risks in their portfolio investments.  
 
Making investments solely in high-risk startup and early-stage growth companies means that 
venture capital companies have to implement sophisticated and robust processes to identify, 
analyze, manage and monitor wide variety of different risks associated with small and fast-growing 
companies that are often developing cutting edge technology and creating new innovative business 
models. In addition to investment risk, venture capital companies also have to manage company 
level risks that are related to business operations and factors, such as reputation, capital raising 
process, financial contracting and exiting investments. Effective company level risk management 
processes and strategy ensure that the core investing operations are able to function efficiently 
without disruptions or wasting unnecessary time or money. However, although the importance of 
risk management for venture capital companies is clear due to the multitude of risks and 
uncertainties that arise from investing in startups and early-stage growth companies, there is only 
a relatively moderate amount of research and studies that examine how venture capital companies 
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create and structure risk management strategies and integrate different risk management processes 
into their core business processes on a company level.  
 
This study aimed to understand how venture capital companies structure their risk management 
strategies and processes on a company level, what are the most important risks venture capital 
companies face and what risk management methods and techniques venture capital companies use 
to control and mitigate these risks. To answer these research questions, a qualitative research 
method using semi-structured interviews for data collection was adopted. This method enabled a 
thorough in-depth study of the research questions and allowed the researcher to investigate each 
interviewees’ motivational factors behind using or not using different risk management strategies, 
processes and methods. In order to make the study as comprehensive as possible within the 
limitations of the study, the researcher first conducted an extensive review of the existing literature 
and studies on venture capital risk management in the theory section of the study, and subsequently 
proceeded to form the interview questionnaire and conduct the interviews by using the data from 
the theory section of the study.  
 
Based on a qualitative analysis of the interview data, it can be concluded that the interviewed 
venture capital companies did not have a formal company level strategy for managing risks, but 
instead, most of them used a standardized risk management framework for evaluating the risks and 
return potential of individual investments. Accordingly, their risk management efforts were mainly 
focused on the screening and due diligence processes for potential investments, and, to some extent, 
monitoring of portfolio companies and completing exit transactions. The results indicate that 
venture capital companies, as organizations with relatively few employees and the sole purpose of 
investing in startups and high-growth companies and helping them grow and finally selling their 
stakes in those companies, are able to manage their risks without creating a formal company level 
risk management strategy or complex company level risk management structures. This finding is 
also supported by the scarcity of previous studies and literature on company-wide risk management 
of venture capital companies. Furthermore, the collected data also shows that most of the 
interviewed venture capital investors did not recognize company level risk management as a major 
differentiator or competitive advantage when raising capital or sourcing new investment 
opportunities. 
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The interview data regarding the most important risks and risk management methods for venture 
capital companies indicates that the industry has a fairly standardized set of notable risks and risk 
management methods that are used to control and mitigate those risks. However, when analyzing 
these results, it is also important to notice that the study excluded all portfolio company specific 
risks in order to be able to examine exclusively the risks that venture capital companies face directly 
in their operations. As a result, the data shows that reputational risks, risks concerning insufficient 
or inadequate screening and due diligence processes, and the risks of a premature exit transaction 
had the highest importance of direct operational risks for the interviewed venture capital 
companies. These findings are in line with general venture capital risk management literature and 
previous research. They confirm that maintaining a good reputation with limited partners, portfolio 
companies and all the other startup ecosystem stakeholders is crucial for venture capital companies. 
The market for venture capital is highly competitive and the differences between various venture 
capital companies are often very small, thus a good reputation is an important competitive 
advantage when raising capital and sourcing new investment opportunities. Additionally, the 
results regarding risks in screening and due diligence processes show how valuable resource time 
itself is for venture capital companies. Because most venture capital companies screen hundreds, 
some even thousands, of possible investments per year, they require highly effective time 
management. Each individual partner of a venture capital company has a finite amount of time for 
finding, reviewing and closing new investments, which means that mistakes or inefficiencies in 
these processes can end up wasting significant amounts of their time. 
 
On the risk management side, the data illustrates that the most important methods for controlling 
and mitigating risks were portfolio diversification, thorough screening and due diligence processes, 
active monitoring of portfolio companies and careful financial contracting. These results, and 
particularly the significance of portfolio diversification, are consistent with the general venture 
capital risk management literature and other studies conducted on the subject of venture capital risk 
management. These findings further confirm that due to the high-risk nature of venture investing 
and the difficulty to predict which startup companies are likely to survive and grow, diversification 
of investments is the most effective way for venture capital companies to control and mitigate the 
investment risk. The study also shows that a well-diversified portfolio helps to mitigate liquidity 
68 
 
related issues by spreading out these transactions along the lifespan of a venture capital fund. 
Moreover, the findings in general indicate that venture capital companies focus their risk 
management efforts more on pre-investment processes, such as diversification, due diligence and 
contracting, than post-investment processes, which are directed more towards guidance and 
assistance rather than just pure risk management. This suggests that from a venture capital 
company’s perspective, after an investment has been made, the remaining risks are mostly indirect 
portfolio company specific risks which are managed by the respective portfolio companies, and 
thus, in most cases, the venture capital company can only try to control these risks through offering 
their portfolio companies advice and support on risk management matters. 
 
The choice to use a qualitative research method to conduct the study and semi-structured interviews 
for data collection was made in order to provide deeper understanding and insights into key factors 
affecting risk management in venture capital companies. However, this research design brings a 
number of limitations that should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. Firstly, the small 
sample size of the study limits the generalizability of the results and may also affect the strength of 
conclusions drawn from the analysis of the interview data. Secondly, the amount of time reserved 
for the phone interviews was not enough in some of the interviews, which meant that the pace of 
those interviews had to be sped up. This may have affected how the interviewees answered the 
interview questions, and therefore, the quality of the data collected from these interviews. Thirdly, 
as with all interviews, the researcher’s interpretation of the answers received is always somewhat 
subjective. Different interviewers may understand and transcribe interviews in different ways due 
to different subjective factors, such as the interviewer’s opinions, attitudes, expertise or 
background. Analogously, different interviewees respond differently depending on how they 
perceive the interviewer, which means that comparability is reduced because wording and 
sequencing will likely be different in each interview. Furthermore, due to the depth of the 
conducted interviews, it is possible that incorrect perceptions on the part of the interviewer with 
regard to what the interviewee said and misunderstanding on the interviewee’s side with regard to 
what was asked, may have affected the reliability of the data collected from the interviews.  
 
This study was performed using a qualitative approach for the purpose of establishing a baseline 
understanding of how venture capital companies perceive and implement risk management in their 
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core investment operations and supporting business functions. However, even though the study 
showed the importance of risk management in venture capital investing, further research on the 
subject is needed in order to produce results that are statistically significant. Therefore, I would 
recommend that future studies use a wide variety of both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods with large enough sample sizes to make statistically significant conclusions. Future studies 
should also take into account the difference between direct risks, which the venture capital 
company can control at least on some level, and indirect risks, which cannot be controlled, but may 
still have a negative impact on the venture capital company. Furthermore, I would suggest that 
future research should consider how factors such as investment strategy, total amount of capital 
under management and preferred stage of investment affect the structure and implementation of 
risk management in venture capital companies. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: Interview questionnaire 
 
1. Does your firm have a formal risk management strategy? If yes, what does it contain and why? 
If not, what are the reasons for not having one? 
 
2. In your opinion, what and why are the most important risks for a venture capital firm during: 
(1) Raising a fund 
(2) Investing the fund’s capital 
(3) Managing the fund’s portfolio and making follow-on investments 
(4) Exiting investments and dissolving the fund 
 
3. Do you see some other notable risks for a venture capital firm besides the risks that are related 
to a fund’s life cycle? 
 
4. Do you use any of the following measures to manage risks in your operations, and what are the 
reasons behind using/not using the method in question? 
(1) Portfolio diversification 
(2) Due diligence 
(3) Financial contracting  
(4) Syndication 
(5) Milestone-based financing 
(6) Selection of board and management 
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(7) Monitoring of portfolio companies 
(8) Specialization to specific industries 
 
5. Are you using some other risk management techniques or tools that were not mentioned in the 
previous question and why?    
 
 
 
